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Abstract  
The findings of this thesis shed new light on the market’s reaction to sell-side analyst’s 
recommendations. The research updates existing literature by showing that positive (negative) 
returns can be made (avoided) by following the positive (negative) recommendations of 
analysts, even after these returns are adjusted by the market, size decile and industry of the 
firm. This thesis also shows that there has been a decline in the markets reaction to the 
recommendation in the years following the Global Financial Crisis. This research posits that 
this decline stems from an erosion of trust between the market and financial analysts. This 
erosion comes as the result of the analyst’s lack of warning to the market before the crisis and 
the behaviour of financial institutions in the lead up and during the crisis itself. These results 
remain robust when adjusting for the confidence and volatility of the market and the Fama-
French five-factor model of returns. Overall despite the erosion of trust it appears that following 
analysts positive (negative) recommendations will still generate (avoid) positive (negative) 
returns for  investors, even after market adjustments following the crisis.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
This thesis explores the yet uncharted literature regarding market reaction to sell-side analyst 
reporting, before and after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).1 The research assesses if there is 
a deviation between how the market reacts to an analysts investment recommendation in the 
years after the GFC. It is hypothesised that following the behaviour of banks and other financial 
institutions in the lead up to, and during the GFC, that there will now be a shift in how the 
market interprets the recommendations of analysts. Specifically, the market will now be less 
inclined to follow the positive recommendations of analysts, those being to buy or hold a stock, 
and this decline will be reflected in a decrease in positive returns after said recommendations 
in the years following the GFC. However, given investors’ appetite for loss aversion (Shefrin 
and Statman, 1985) they will be more inclined to follow negative recommendations, these 
being to sell a stock, and this will be reflected in an increase in negative returns as investors 
sell to avoid losses.2 
It is conjectured that the inefficient and ineffective actions taken by banks and financial 
institutions created a pivotal shift in how the market interprets the information released by these 
institutions. The markets cynicism toward financial institutions increased during the GFC, but 
it is hypothesised that even in the years following the end of the GFC the market’s cynicism 
toward the banks and financial institutions remains; this will be reflected in lower market 
reaction to analyst positive recommendations. However, given the uncertainty now embedded 
in investors they will be more willing to follow sell recommendations.  
                                                          
1 Here after use of the term analyst is in reference to sell-side analysts, unless specifically outlined 
otherwise.  
2 The selling of stock places negative pressure on the price leading to negative returns.  
- 2 - 
 
The market relies on the information that analysts provide to make investment decisions 
(Kelly et al. 2012). Therefore evidence that the recommendations of analysts did not provide 
adequate warning of the impending crisis could lead investors to develop a new found distrust 
in these recommendations (Davies and McGoey, 2012; Hindmoor and McMonnell, 2013). This 
is a key focal point of this thesis, how does the market now interpret the information that is 
released through analyst recommendations?   
The motivation behind this research is twofold. Firstly, the current research regarding 
market reaction to analyst reporting is relatively dated (Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 
1983; Wijmenga, 1990; Womack, 1996). These papers found that it was possible to develop a 
profitable trading strategy by following the recommendations of analysts, however given 
potential increases in market efficiency in recent years, stemming from the increased 
information environment that markets now operate in, it is possible that these returns have 
dissipated (Yang et al., 2008). Whilst there is a degree of literature that indicates a decline in 
trust following the GFC (Sapienxa and Zingales, 2012; Shiller, 2012; Gillespie and Hurley, 
2013), no research has yet assessed whether there is a change in market reactivity stemming 
from this change and whether there is a new reluctance (desire) to follow analyst positive 
(negative) recommendations. This thesis will fill this research gap.  
Beyond filling a gap in the current academic literature this thesis also has practical and 
clear economic significance. Should the research indicate that the market has a clear and 
correlated reaction to the recommendation of analysts, a trading strategy can be implemented 
to take advantage of this pattern and generate abnormal returns. If however there is no reaction 
by the market one must question the function of analyst recommendations; if the market is not 
reacting to their recommendations then there does not appear to be a transfer of information 
from these ‘experts’ to the market. Hence, a lack of market reactivity questions the function of 
analyst’s recommendations.  
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The results of this thesis also update the existing literature regarding the returns that 
can be generated by following the recommendations of analysts. Results show that following 
analysts buy recommendations will produce positive raw returns across all of the tested 
timeframes utilised in this thesis.3 These returns remain positive even after adjusted for market 
movements and the movements of firms of similar size and the same industry. The results show 
that by an investor simply following the buy recommendation of analyst they can achieve raw 
returns of over 22% per annum; 12% when adjusted for market returns over the same period.  
The research further shows that following sell recommendations the raw returns were 
in-fact positive up to 252 days proceeding the recommendation. However, once the adjustments 
for market, size and industry of the firm were considered the returns became negative. 
Suggesting that analysts may not be able to identify the firms that perform poorly outright, but 
relative to other market factors they can select loser firms. Finally, hold recommendations 
produce positive abnormal raw and market adjusted returns which implies that firms that are 
able to gain the positive coverage of analysts will see positive returns. However, when these 
returns are adjusted by the size and industry of the firm they actually become negative, 
indicating that relative to similar firms the markets does not see the recommendation of a hold 
as a positive net present value proposition.   
Regression analysis was used to assess a change in returns following the GFC. These 
returns indicated that the GFC did indeed lead to lower returns following positive (negative) 
recommendations. These results remain robust when adjusting for movements in the market, 
the volatility and confidence of the market and the Fama-French 5 factor model; all of which 
show a significant fall in returns after the GFC. The returns did however lack significant 
difference across some of the timeframes measured when the returns were adjusted by the size 
                                                          
3 The tested timeframes were t+1, t+5, t+30, t+60, t+90, t+120, t+180 and t+252. Where t+0 represents 
the announcement date of the recommendation by an analyst.  
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and industry of the recommended firm, suggesting that these two factors could be the driving 
force behind the change in returns.  
Evidence from other studies following the GFC suggest that there were increases in 
levels of firm transparency, decreases in analyst forecasting error and dispersion, and 
unchanged level of analyst coverage after the crisis. These factors should all lead to a more 
information efficient market in-which the information within analysts’ recommendations is 
better transferred to investors. This increase in information efficiency should result in higher 
returns for firms (Jiang, Lee, & Zhang, 2005). The lower returns that are evident after the GFC 
could be attributed to an alternate factor that has shifted investor’s preference; this thesis argues 
that the shifts stems from a change in trust between the market and the analysts whom the 
market rely on for information.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a 
comprehensive review of existing literature. Chapter 3 outlines the hypotheses of the thesis. 
Chapter 4 details the modelling techniques and the data in use.  Chapter 5 presents the empirical 
results and robustness tests on the empirical results. Finally Chapter 6 concludes and 
summarises the research.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
2.1 - Analysts Impact on the Market  
 
The actions of analysts have a profound impact on the market; they motivate management to 
perform better; increasing the value of firms (Chung & Jo, 1996). Furthermore evidence by 
Derrien and Kecskes (2013) showed that decreases in the number of analysts following a firm 
was associated with an increase in information asymmetry between the firm and the market. 
The study also concluded that a firm losing analyst coverage was followed by a 2% decrease 
in investment expenditure by the covered firm. The explanation stemmed from increased 
information asymmetry; thus indicating that analysts have an influential role on firm operations 
and price determination, more than just the brokerage services they provide.  
A large function of analyst is the production of analysts’ recommendation reports, in 
which analysts give guidance to the market as to how they forecast the firm will perform in the 
future. It is these analyst recommendations that are the focal point of this research. The 
recommendations that are issued are communicated in five categories, 1) Strong Buy, 2) Buy, 
3) Hold, 4) Underperform and 5) Sell; all with decreasing prospects regarding the firms future.  
Womack (1996) conducted a study assessing the market’s reaction to changes in analyst 
recommendations. Womack used a sample of 1,573 recommendation changes, across 822 firms 
between 1989 and 1991, to conclude that there is a large market reaction when sell-side analysts 
chose to change their recommendation. When previous sell or hold (buy or hold) 
recommendations were adjusted to buy (sell) recommendations the markets’ reactions 
generated cumulative raw returns of +3.27% (-4.32%) in the three-days following the 
recommendation. The market reaction to buy recommendations appear to be short-lived, with 
an incremental return for the first post recommendation month of 4.57% , but 6-month post 
event returns reverting to -0.86%. However, sell recommendations do not appear to follow the 
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same trend, with post recommendation drift reaching -0.68% one month following the 
recommendation, and -4.36% over a longer 6-month period. The conclusion from this paper is 
that there is difference in how the market reacts to buy and sell recommendations. It appears 
that the short term reactions are much more aggressive following positive recommendations, 
resulting in a longer term reduction. Whilst negative recommendations see a slower short term 
reaction that builds over the long term.  Overall both scenarios show that the market responds 
in the associated direction of an analyst’s recommendation. The Womack paper forms the 
foundation for the research in this thesis. With this thesis extending the literature by analysing 
if there is a difference in the markets reaction to analysts’ reports following the GFC. One clear 
negative of the Womack paper is the short time frame that the study has collected observations 
from, only 3 years (January 1989 to December 1991). A short data time frame threatens the 
external validity of the findings as the returns that were generated are much more exposed to 
the business cycle of the time. By using a larger sampling period of 15 years concerns regarding 
the time frame can be lowered through the research of this thesis.  
In an older study Bjerring, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) also found that abnormal 
returns can be achieved by investors following the recommendations of analysts in both the 
United States and Canada. However, this paper found insignificant returns in the United States 
during the week of announcement. The returns only became significant when observing 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 29 weeks and beyond after the recommendation.4 CARs 
accumulate the returns that are made over a given period to see the total holding return over 
said period above the market. However, in Canada a return of 1.801% was present during the 
immediate week after the analyst announcement, with CARs evident from 22 weeks onward 
following the recommendation.5  
                                                          
4 The returns ran up to 142 weeks where the data ceased.   
5 The returns ran up to 179 weeks where the data ceased.   
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Howe, Unlu and Yan (2009) assessed over 350,000 analyst recommendation between 
1994 and 2006 and found that analysts’ recommendations have predictive qualities. The 
research found that aggregate analyst recommendations were able to produce excess returns in 
the future after controlling for macroeconomic variables. Similarly, changes in industry-
aggregated analyst recommendations were able to produce future excess returns at an industry 
level. These findings suggest that analysts reporting provides the market with not just firm-
specific information, but also additional information at the industry level.6 
The literature also suggests that market reactivity is not exclusively reserved for 
analysts reporting. Sant and Zaman (1996) found that firms covered by the Business Week 
column ‘Inside Wall Street’ experienced significant positive abnormal returns in the short-run; 
mirroring the results of Womack (1996). These findings suggest that the market appears to 
listen to the opinions of experts, and trusts that they know where the best investment 
opportunities lie. However, Sant and Zaman’s research also found that over a 6-month latter 
period from being featured in the ‘Inside Wall Street’ column returns for these firms were on 
average negative. Suggesting an element of short-run overreaction, leading to a longer-term 
market correction.  
Trueman (1994) modelled that analysts will have the tendency to release 
recommendations that align with those of other analysts. He writes that this herding behaviour 
will lead to circumstances where analysts release forecasts that are more in-line with those of 
other analysts, even if the private information of the analyst suggests otherwise. Trueman 
concluded that the likelihood of an analyst releasing a forecast similar to those that have been 
previously announced is greater than could be justified solely by the information of the analyst. 
Trueman’s research extends outside the recommendation itself and claims that analysts will 
                                                          
6 This is despite the analysts’ recommendations being in-regards to a specific firm.   
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also herd with regard to the release date of their announcement. This will result in situations 
where analysts release their recommendations close to one-another, but also closer than 
appropriate to earnings expectations.7 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) also found evidence to support the claim that analysts herd 
with regard to their recommendations. However, they also found many instances where the 
recommendations of analysts were not the same. In instances where analysts do not herd, the 
market appears more reactive to the contrary recommendation than to those of the majority. 
Jegadeesh and Kim believe that this stems from an understanding by the market that there is 
herding amongst analyst recommendations. Jegadeesh and Kim argue that armed with this 
knowledge of analyst herding the market sees the release of a contrary recommendation as 
bringing new information forward; the increased information release is reflected in market 
reactions.  
R-squared is a widely used as a measure for the synchronicity of stocks (Morck, Yeung 
and Yu, 2000; Dasgupta, Gan and Gao, 2010; Kelly, 2014). Synchronicity is the tendency of 
stocks to move together, especially occurring in stocks in the same industry. Lower 
synchronicity means the market price is more determined by firm specific factors. Devos et al. 
(2015) found that firms with a lower R-square have a higher price reactivity and experience 
larger changes in daily trading volume in response to an analysts purchase recommendation.8 
Devos et al. believe that this stems from these firms having less firm transparency, resulting in 
a greater information asymmetry between the firm and the market; relative to higher R-squared 
firms.  
                                                          
7 Trueman deemed the announcements to be too close to the announcement of earnings expectations as 
he did not believe that the information content of the forecasts provided the market with enough 
additional information over what was revealed during the earnings expectations released by the firm. 
8 Firms with lower R-squared are those that are less likely to move in the same direct as others.   
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Sant and Zaman (1996a) found that market reactivity to firm based news increases as 
the number of analysts following said firm decreases, supporting the theory of Devos et al. 
(2015); that increases in information asymmetry between the market and the firm increases 
price reactivity. However, Sant and Zaman do state that as the number of analysts approaches 
20 the incremental decrease in information asymmetry plateaus to a point where adding more 
analysts does not aid in information transfer.9  
Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) suggest that analysts not only bring forward new 
information to the market, but that they also solidify prior knowledge. This solidification of 
information transfer appears to be more apparent in recommendation downgrades. 
Furthermore, Asquith, Mikhail and Au found no correlation between the price forecast 
methodology and the market reactions to the recommendation. It appears that price targets and 
analyst justification for these price targets are the only significant elements of the analyst 
report. As a result this thesis does not control for valuation methodology that is used by the 
analyst as it is unlikely to impact the market’s reaction. The market only appears concerned 
with the valuation itself, not necessarily the exact steps that were taken to arrive at said 
valuation.  
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) conducted surveys on executives of financial 
firms to determine the motivations and decision making processes of management. The survey 
results suggest that equity analysts have significant influence of management and as a result 
investors. Management will often take great effort to meet the forecasts of analysts so as to 
appease their investors. The reporting by analysts therefore has influence over the behaviour 
of management, supporting the research claims of Chung and Jo (1996).  
                                                          
9 Sant and Zaman do note that the relationship between increasing the number of analysts and the 
information transfer does not become negative.   
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2.2 - Market Reaction to News  
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) claims that security prices fully reflect all available 
information rapidly and in an unbiased fashion (Fama, 1970). This claim carries with it the 
implication that prices must incorporate the addition of new information within a very short 
period. However, research by Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) examined stock returns in the 
United States for over 20 years (1962-1985) and found that the market does not appear to 
completely react as quickly as the EMH suggests; there appears to be a longer term time lag. 
This lag is likely associated with the markets heterogeneous interpretation of new information, 
leading to a slower incorporation of all the information released. Brown, Harlow and Tinic also 
found that the market has a tendency to react more strongly to negative news, than it does to 
positive news. However, Brown, Harlow and Tinic do conclude that the market’s reaction to 
the information is efficient, but in a more measured time frame than the hypothesised rapid 
reaction.  
 Wijmenga (1990) found that the market is reactive to the issuance of weekly analyst 
recommendations. The research indicated that constructing a portfolio that exclusively 
replicated weekly analyst recommendations would produce significant returns of 1.703% 
during the week of the recommendations, and a further 1.669% for the week following. Thus 
indicating strong market reactivity to the recommendations. However, Wijmenga also found 
that after this two-week period the market appeared to stabilise, with no further returns made 
in subsequent weeks. This market reaction is to be expected, with the market initially reacting 
to the news of the recommendation and incorporating it into the price. However, the reaction 
to the news was not complete, this is evident as excess returns were still made in the second 
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week.10 Thus supporting the theory of Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) that the market does 
lag in regards to information interpretation.  
 Sant and Zaman (1996) found that firms covered by the Business Week column ‘Inside 
Wall Street’ experienced significant positive abnormal returns in the short-run; mirroring the 
results of Womack (1996). These findings suggest that the market appears to listen to the 
opinions of experts, and trusts that they know where the best investment opportunities lie. 
However, Sant and Zaman’s research also found that over a 6-month latter period from being 
featured in the ‘Inside Wall Street’ column returns for these firms were on average negative. 
Suggesting an element of short-run overreaction, leading to a longer-term market correction.  
Keasler and McNeil (2010) assessed the market’s reaction to recommendations made 
on the popular CNBC show ‘Mad Money’. The study indicated that in the day following the 
shows airing the recommended purchases experienced a return of +1.48%, whilst the sell 
recommendations suffered a -0.88% market reaction. Furthermore there were large increases 
in the trading volumes of stocks that were featured on the show. This evidence indicates that 
the market once more reacts strongly to recommendations of stocks. However, Keasler and 
McNeil also found that constructing a portfolio that replicated the recommendations made on 
the show would yield returns significantly lower than that of the market. In a 13-month period 
following a stock being featured on the show returns were 7.7%, whilst over that same period 
the market returned 14.8%; much like with the returns of firms in the Business Week column 
‘Inside Wall Street’ (Sant & Zaman, 1996). This again indicates that the market has a strong 
positive (negative) reaction to buy (sell) recommendations, but this reaction is short lived and 
over a longer timeframe the returns are not maintained. These results indicate that the market 
does react positively to the recommendations of financial analysts, but does not react as well 
                                                          
10 The weeks are defined as 5 business days following the issuance of the recommendation. 
Recommendations could be issued on any business days of the week.   
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to the recommendations from non-financial firms (television shows and the Business Week 
column).    
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) argue that anticipation of news impacts trading behaviour 
of investors. Wherein, the market reacts before any information is released by the company, 
and as a result the market will then not be as reactive when the information is released. Kim 
and Verrecchia further argue that when the market anticipates the release of news investors’ 
information seeking behaviour is also altered. If investors listen to the anticipated news and 
believe it they are less likely to conduct research themselves or contact experts. By investors 
now choosing to no longer seek information themselves the level of information in the market 
declines. As a result, this alteration to information seeking results in an overall less information 
efficient market which can lead to prices deviating from fundamental values. 
Gleason and Lee (2003) concluded that the market does not appear to make sufficient 
distinction between when analysts’ reports provide the market with new information and when 
the reports are merely moving toward consensus. From this Gleason and Lee suggest that the 
market is not as efficient at interpreting information as previously thought. Second the paper 
found that price adjustments following a report are both faster and more complete if coming 
from ‘celebrity’ analysts than from more obscure analysts that were more accurate; similar to 
findings of Park and Stice (2000) regarding ‘superior analysts’.11 This again lends support to 
Gleason and Lee’s argument that the market is not as information efficient as expected. As 
suggested by Sant and Zaman (1996a), Gleason and Lee also find that the market is more 
reactive to analysts’ reports if there are more analysts following the same stock, with their 
justification linking to investors being more willing to follow the report if it is supported by 
other analysts from independent firms.  
                                                          
11 ‘Celebrity’ analysts are those considered All-Stars by the Institutional Investor's All-American 
Research Team and/or were listed as a Wall Street Journal's Survey of Award Winning Analyst.   
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 These opposing ideologies will be tested in this thesis; do we see an instant market 
reaction to analysts’ recommendations (Fama, 1970; Malkiel, 1973, 1989) or a more gradual 
one (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Brown Harlow and Tinic, 1988)?  
2.3 - Overreaction to News 
  
Keynes (1936) was the first academic to reference the markets tendency to overreact to 
information release in the short-run. He commented: 
“Day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing investments, which are obviously 
of an ephemeral and non-significant character, tend to have an altogether 
excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the market.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 87)  
Since this point a number of academics have reported results that fall in line with Keynes 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Howe, 1986; Brown and Harlow, 
1988; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). However, there is no clear consensus on what is driving 
these short-run reactions. Additionally, Williams (1938) noted that the market appears to place 
higher emphasis on short term information, than longer term. This comes with the implication 
that the market will overreact to news in the short run, as a result underreacting in the long run.  
 Kahneman and Tversky (1982), build on the theory of Williams (1938), by concluding 
that investors overweigh the significance of new information and place less emphasis on older 
news. This even occurs at times when the older information is more important to the investor, 
yet they still have a tendency to be influenced more by the new information; at least in the short 
run. Arrow (1982) conceptually agreed with the theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), 
noting that this situation is not reserved just for stocks, but also encompasses all securities and 
futures markets.  
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 Overall the literature shows that the release of new information into the market is 
followed by profound adjusts in the stock price of the reporting firms. This reaction extends to 
the release of analysts’ reports and valuations. However, the reactions that the market has, may 
not be as unbiased and instantaneous as hypothesised by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This 
thesis adds to this literature by providing an insight into how the market reacts to information 
releases, and assess if it is possible to generate returns should a reaction consistently be present. 
Additionally this thesis will explore if these returns were impacted by the GFC and its long 
term repercussions.  
2.4 - Global Financial Crisis and the Breakdown of Trust 
  
Bouslah, Kryzanowski and M’Zali (2016) examined the risk profiles of firms following the 
GFC. They found that firms experienced a decrease in their levels of systematic risk and no 
change in the levels of idiosyncratic risk; mirroring the findings of Dimitrov, Palia and Tang 
(2015). Therefore it appears that changes in the levels of risk regarding firms cannot be used 
to explain the decrease in reactivity to analysts’ recommendations. Changes in reactivity appear 
to be caused by another factor; this thesis argues that factor to do a deterioration in the level of 
trust between the market and the firms providing the recommendation.   
Past literature indicates that there is a strong association between trust and the 
operations of financial markets. Arrow (1972) wrote that “Virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a 
period of time” (Arrow, 1972, p. 357). Arrow argued that without trust in markets cooperation 
between firm’s collapses, resulting in a breakdown of financing, leading to a reduction in 
investment. Sapienxa and Zingales (2012) conjecture that it was a breakdown of trust between 
financial institutions and the wider market during the GFC that allowed the recession to slide 
to the low levels that it did.  
- 15 - 
 
 Gillespie and Hurley (2013) also explored the link between the GFC and a reduction in 
trust following it. In their research Gillespie and Hurley outlined a number of elements that 
resulted in the trust failures which contributed to the GFC. In financial institutions these failures 
stemmed from poor risk management, lax lending standards, a failure of senior management to 
lead their firm and management not being held accountable for their actions. Additionally a 
failure from the rating agencies to adequately evaluate the exotic financial instruments that the 
financial institutions were dealing with compromised the integrity of these agencies. Finally, 
Gillespie and Hurley highlight a failure by regulators and the US Government to effectively 
regulate mortgage securitisation, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps 
resulted in an erosion of trust between investors and the market.  
 Shiller (2012) fears that the breakdown of trust will not cease because the GFC has 
ended. Shiller stated that “The memories of these traumas [in reference to poor business 
performance during the GFC] will harm confidence and trust in our markets for years to come, 
just as they did during the Great Depression” (Shiller, 2012, p. 171). But Shiller hypothesises 
that the negative impacts of the GFC are widespread, extending even beyond financial systems. 
Shiller states that the loss of trust and belief in the economic system impacts not just the 
economy, but has negative consequences for the social fabric that binds society. It can lead to 
distrust in all aspects of life. 
 Hoffman, Post and Pennings (2013) state that “this [in-regards to the GFC] dramatic 
shock to investor wealth, combined with this market period’s uncertainty and volatility, could 
permanently shift investor perceptions of the stock market as well as of their personal 
investments” (Hoffmann, Post, & Pennings, 2013, p. 61) . These factors point toward a market 
in-which investors are deeply affected by the events, and consequently adjust their investment 
behaviour.  
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 Luhmann (2000) writes that there is an interrelated relationship between trust and 
confidence in consumers; however the two characteristics are uniquely different. As confidence 
declines so does the level of trust that is held between both parties. One measure of confidence 
is the OECD release of a monthly index of the level of consumer confidence in financial 
markets, the Consumer Confidence Index (CCI). Research by Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006) suggest that consumer confidence is a good proxy for investor confidence and was 
therefore routinely used as a confidence proxy (Schmeling, 2009; Chen, 2011; Zouaoui, 
Nouyrigat, & Beer, 2011). Inclusive of and following the GFC the CCI went it the longest 
streak below 100 12 that the United States has ever had since the 1960 publication of the index. 
The streak lasted 86 months, between August 2007 and September 2014. This depression in 
confidence represents a decline in trust the likes of which have never been recorded.13 This 
decline in consumer confidence is also supported by the research of Sapienxa and Zingales 
(2012) who found that consumers held overly negative views toward the stock market, brokers 
and banks during the GFC, but also in years that followed. 
 The CCI indicates a downturn in confidence that coincides with a fall in the value of 
the Standard and Poor’s 500. During the period of the GFC correlation between the market and 
the CCI was 89.5%. This follows the research of Sandoval Junior and Franca (2012), who 
found that during time of financial crises correlation with the market rises. As confidence falls, 
investors sell more positions or refrain from purchasing, which drives down the value of the 
market (Sturm, 2003). However, unlike previously crises the high correlation between the 
market and investor confidence remained after the GFC; with confidence remaining below the 
long-run average of the index until 2014. This suggests that there is a difference between how 
the market reacted to the GFC compared to other crises, with trust being rebuilt at a much 
                                                          
12 100 is the benchmarks objective level of neutral consumer confidence.   
13 It is noted that the Great Depression could have created a longer confidence fall, however data 
constraints make this hard to prove.   
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slower rate than before. Never before had consumer confidence remained so low for such an 
extended period of time than following a stock market downturn. This produces further 
motivation for this thesis; the concept that the market has shifted its view of financial markets 
with regards to trust.  
 This attitude also has currency in key public institutions. The then Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke stated in a public address that “As in all past crises, at the root 
of the problem is a loss of confidence by investors and the public in the strength of key financial 
institutions and markets” (Bernanke, 2008). Bernanke explained that this loss of confidence 
must be restored for the market to function once more, but that this can only occur if the agents 
in the market (firms and their investors) have trust.  
 Earle (2009) echoes the beliefs of Bernanke, arguing that the loss of trust between the 
market and the financial institutions must be restored to enable an effective and efficient 
recovery from the GFC. “When the bubble burst and banks started failing, trust and low 
perceived risk were rapidly replaced by distrust and panic” (Earle, 2009, p. 788). Earle argued 
that it was as a result of this panic and lack of trust that resulted in the liquidity crisis 
experienced throughout the GFC. The liquidity crisis exacerbated the panic and worsened the 
impact of the crisis.  
 Scalera and Dixon (2016) examined trust and confidence during the GFC across 
Europe, specially examining public trust in the European Central Bank. Scalera and Dixon 
found results that were similar to that of the United States, in that investors were more wary to 
place their trust in financial institutions during and following the GFC. Scalera and Dixon 
believe that despite it being many years since the GFC that, “economic instability and distrust 
of economic institutions seem to be the ‘new normal’ in the European Union” (Scalera & 
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Dixon, 2016, p. 388).14 It appears the public’s negative attitude toward financial institutions 
was not solely reserved for the United States.  
2.5 - Loss Aversion 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed in the work on behavioural economics that people 
have differing risk tolerances under differing scenarios. Until this work the rationale behind 
economic theory was that of rational, risk neutral behaviour; wherein risk tolerance levels were 
based on the returns that could be made. Kahneman and Tversky state that this leads to 
situations where individuals dislike suffering losses much more than the satisfaction they 
derive from incurring gains. Building from this work, Shefrin and Statman (1985) applied the 
theory outside of behaviour economics and adapted it to financial markets. Thus leading to 
scenarios where investors are more willing to sell stock to save themselves suffering a loss of 
x, than they are from purchasing stock to make an equal gain. This theory is what supports the 
hypothesis of increased negative returns after a negative recommendation from an analysts 
following the GFC. The negative payoffs associated with not following a buy recommendations 
from an analysts are only opportunity costs; those of the potential gains one could have made. 
Therefore the risks of not following a buy recommendation are relatively low. However, failure 
to follow an accurate sell recommendation carries a much greater negative payoffs should the 
investor hold said stock.15 Failure to follow an accurate sell recommendation will result in real 
losses to investor value, which in accordance with Shefrin and Statman, and Kahneman and 
Tversky will be felt greatly by the investors. Therefore, the investors are more inclined to 
follow the analysts regarding sell recommendations than they are with buy recommendations. 
                                                          
14 With the papers publication being 2016, this was eight years following the 2008 GFC.   
15 This ignores the implications for short-sellers who would open a position given a sell 
recommendations.  
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Thus creating an asymmetry in how the market interprets positive news (buy and hold 
recommendations) and negative news (sell recommendations).  
Following the GFC investors are now more wary against suffering losses this too could 
explain why investors may be more likely to follow the sell recommendation of analysts, 
despite the predication of lower following stemming from distrust (Steverman, 2009; Shell, 
2010). Whilst the distrust may still be apparent, following the research of Shefrin and Statman 
(1985) the investors still wish to avoid losses more so than they did before the GFC. 
The argument of market reaction asymmetry regarding positive news and negative news 
is well document in current literature. Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006) found that equity 
markets across the globe, including the United States, revealed a tendency of asymmetric 
reactions to news; with negative news being responded to more negatively by the market than 
equal positive news. Soroka (2006) argues “that negative information has a much greater 
impact on individuals’ attitudes than does positive information” (Soroka, 2006, p. 372), with 
the implication being that this shifts the interpretation of the news outside the content of the 
information itself.  
Engle and Ng (1993) tested a number of volatility models and their reaction to various 
news releases. The authors found evidence that there was an asymmetry in how the market 
responded to positive news and negative news. With negative news being reacted too much 
more aggressively, but also with increased consistency. These results were mirrored by Booth, 
Martikainen and Tse (1997) who also found an asymmetry between how volatility responded 
to positive news and negative news.   
A further explanation of market reaction asymmetry is that of management disclosures 
within the firms that are being recommended. Kothari, Shu and Wysocki (2009) found that 
managers of firms have a tendency to withhold negative news until it cannot be withheld any 
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longer, but release positive news to appease investors at a much more frequent rate. Therefore 
the release of analysts sell recommendation could be providing new information to the market 
before the management release it themselves; hence the reaction. 
It is these theories that indicate a news reaction asymmetry that support the hypothesis 
of more negative returns following sell recommendations. Now due to increased market 
pessimism loss aversion will be higher in the market and this should be reflected in the more 
negative returns.   
2.6 - Analysts Behaviour Following the Global Financial 
Crisis  
 
Chun and Rhee (2015) examined if there were any changes in analyst coverage or effort by 
auditors following the GFC. Analyst’s coverage was measured through the traditional 
approach, the number of analysts following a firm. However, auditor effort was measured 
through the hours that auditors spend auditing the firm. Chun and Rhee believe that this 
measure minimises potential measurement error associated with the traditional measure of 
audit fees. They found that there was no material change in analyst’s coverage or auditor effort 
following the GFC. Therefore any potential changes in the market’s reaction to analysts’ 
recommendations are unlikely to be attributed to such factors. The deviations must be the result 
of another force. 
 Merkley, Michaely and Pacelli (2017) showed that there was no overall change in the 
number of analysts following firms before or after the GFC, therefore there should be no change 
in the efficiency of the analysts’ reports. The paper did find that as the number of analysts 
following a firm increases the returns associated with that firm also rise. Therefore as there was 
no change in the number of analysts following firms any pre-GFC to post-GFC return deviation 
is unlikely to be attributed to changes in analyst coverage. 
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Jung, Wong and Zhang (2017) found that the number of conference calls, used as a 
proxy of analysts and management interaction, increased every year during their 2002 to 2009 
research window. This suggests that during the GFC itself analysts saw an increase in their 
interactions with management, and therefore much of the forecasting error increases could be 
associated with market factors.   
Research has been conducted to assess the performance of analysts during financial 
crises. Hope and Kang (2005) were the first to determine that analysts forecast accuracy 
decreases during times of economic uncertainty and crisis. Whereby as the market experiences 
these crisis periods the ability of analysts to predict the performance of firms is significantly 
reduced. These results were reflected in research regarding the performance of analysts during 
the GFC, with Sidhu and Tan (2011), Chang, Hoii and Wee (2014) and Stotz (2016) detecting 
an increase in analyst forecast error and dispersion during the crisis itself.  
 In slight contrast to the above research, Clarke et al. (2006) found that analyst appear 
able to detect firm specific bankruptcies before they occur. In which the number of sell 
recommendations increases, with buy and hold recommendations decreasing in the run up to 
the firm filing for bankruptcy. This appears to suggest that analysts inaccuracies rise during 
times of economic crisis, but analysts are able to determine fundamental failures regarding the 
firms that they follow. This was further supported by Jones and Johnstone (2012) who found 
even during the GFC itself analysts were able to detect an incoming firm bankruptcy and adjust 
their recommendations accordingly.  
Stotz (2016) was able to determine that analyst forecast error rose during the GFC, but 
that this error lowered considerably following the end of the crisis. The level of analyst’s error 
declined to levels less than the average by late 2009, indicating that following the GFC error 
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regarding analysts forecasting should not have been a problem for investors.16 Stotz also found 
that the average following of firms remained unchanged between pre-GFC and post-GFC. With 
research indicating that the number of analysts covering a firm matters to investors, a lack of 
change in coverage cannot be the explanation to the lower reactivity. Stotz also found that 
analysts overwhelming issue positive recommendations for firms, mirroring the research of 
many studies, (Darlin, 1983; Gibson and Wall, 1984; Siconolfi, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; 
McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Brown et al. 1985; O’Brien, 1998; Butler and Lang, 1991; 
Chopra, 1998; Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998 etc.) this thesis included.  
  Loh and Stulz (2017) show that there are increases in analyst forecasting error during 
times of market decline, this is true across a number of crises not just the GFC, with these 
results holding true even when the results are adjusted for market volatility. The market reacts 
more to both upgrades and downgrades during times of crisis; again this holds very much true 
for the GFC. However slightly contradictory to the findings of Loh and Stultz, research by Hsu, 
Yu and Wen (2013) found that when analysing IPO firm data and the analysts that follow them, 
forecast error of analysts appears to be statistically unchanged between the pre-GFC, during 
the GFC and post-GFC periods. However this could be driven by the different dataset 
approaches used by the researchers.  
 Athanassakos and Kalimipall (2003) found a strong relationship between forecast 
dispersion and volatility. In which, increasing dispersion is linked to increasing volatility. 
Hence in a more stable market we can expect lower dispersion. This relationship appears to 
hold true even at a macroeconomic level, where increases in uncertainty and volatility is 
directly linked with increases in forecast error. Following the GFC the Chicago Board Options 
                                                          
16 The study itself covered a window of 2003 to 2014.   
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Exchange’s Volatility Index (VIX) lowered to levels below the long-run average, suggesting 
that dispersion should have lowered following the crisis.  
 Ali et al. (2012) found that firms with less corporate disclosure see increased forecast 
dispersion amongst analysts following said firm. It therefore stands to reason that increased 
disclosure lowers dispersion. Hence regulatory changes that force such actions would lower 
dispersion overall.  
Following the GFC we have seen increasing performance in stock markets, 
decreasing/unchanged analyst error levels, increasing/unchanged analyst coverage, 
decreasing/unchanged analyst desperation, and increasing/unchanged market transparency, all 
of which the research suggests should resulted in increased market reaction to analysts 
forecasting. 
2.7 - Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis  
 
Following the GFC increased pressure was placed on regulators to increase transparency in 
financial markets (Davies, 2009; Obama, 2010). These pressures mirrored the research of Bhat, 
Hope and Kang (2006) and Cheong and Masum (2010) who found that increases in firm 
transparency was linked to more efficient markets and saw positive correlation between 
increased transparency and analysts forecast accuracy. Furthering this point Fabozzi, Focardi 
and Jonas (2010) claim that following the GFC investors now demand higher levels of 
transparency regarding the securities that they are purchasing. The authors believe that these 
transparency requirements go above and beyond what is required by regulations. 
 This pressure saw the introduction of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, which aimed to “…promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system…” (Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010, p. 1). Research has been devoted to 
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assessing the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank Act. Upon the Act’s proposal Firger (2010) 
argued that such an Act may be ineffective, raising concerns that regulations regarding 
transparency can be particularly difficult to police. He argues that it is challenging for 
regulators to police issues regarding disclosure and transparency in both an effective and 
efficient manner. However, Benos, Payne and Vasios (2016) show that the implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act appears to be relatively successful with improvements to lending activities 
and by extension market liquidity. They claim that the increased transparency requirements of 
the regulation improves trading conditions for market participants. Furthering the research 
regarding Dodd-Franks effectiveness, Dimitrov, Palia and Tang (2015) found that measures of 
risk were lower after the introduction of the Dodd Frank Act. The average stock beta, total 
stock return volatility and idiosyncratic stock return volatility were all lower after the Act was 
introduced.  
 Acharya, Cooley, Richardson and Walter (2010) pose a different approach of how 
regulators should have approached the financial world following the GFC. The authors argue 
that there are two approaches regulators could have taken. Firstly the implementation of 
regulations design to prevent future financial crises and require financial support from 
taxpayers to overcome, such as the Dodd-Frank approach. Or alternatively they suggest that 
financial institutions should be forced to adhere to a taxation system whereby the institutions 
are systematically taxed based on their contribution of the systematic risk in the market. This 
dogma is supported by the research of Krainer (2012), who concludes that both approaches 
carry strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the approach Dodd-Frank Act is that it was 
supported by many of the best economic minds available and thus has robust support. The key 
negative is that an approach such as this should have been taken historically and the onset of 
the GFC questions such an approaches effectiveness. The alternate approach of using a new 
taxation system to discourage the behaviour banks took during the GFC from occurring again 
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by internalises the problem to the banks themselves. The threat of taxation penalties for 
increased systematic risk should dissuade the banks from doing so. The key negative however 
is finding an appropriate level of taxation to use; too low and the banks will be willing to incur 
the taxation penalties due to the returns they could be making; too high and the regulation 
threatens the liquidity and efficiency of the banks’ operations.  
 Following from this literature review the next chapter will outline the hypotheses that 
are used to form the basis of the research. The hypotheses build from the foundation of the 
literature to address and adjust for differing aspects in the hopes of improving the robustness 
of the results.   
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Chapter 3 – Hypothesis Formation  
 
Before we are able to test if there is a deviation between pre-GFC and post-GFC returns 
following analyst recommendations, it must be determined if returns are possible at all. Hence 
the following hypothesise were designed to test if returns are possible; these are then adjusted 
for multiple factors as to increase the robustness of the findings. 
𝐻1𝐴 ∶  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝐻1𝐵 ∶  𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑤 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
Positive recommendations are those that advise the purchase of stock (buy recommendations) 
or the holding of existing positions (hold recommendations). Conversely negative 
recommendations are those that advise the sale of stock (sell recommendations). Therefore the 
hypothesis is that if an investor were to follow the positive (negative) recommendation of 
analyst and consider no other factors they will achieve (avoid) positive (negative) returns.  
 To increase the robustness of the results a number of adjustments to the returns were 
made. It is further hypothesised that even when adjusting for market factors positive economic 
returns are achievable. Adjustments for market movements over the test period are important 
to make, as perhaps any abnormal returns that were present were the result of market 
movements in the same direction. By adjusting for the market these worries will no longer 
persist. Hence H2 addresses these concerns.  
𝐻2𝐴 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻2𝐵 ∶ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
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Hon, Lim and Stein (2000) suggest that size of a firm could impact its reactivity to news. This 
is because size works as a good proxy for information availability to the market. Larger firms 
have greater coverage in the news stemming from a higher public profile (Barber & Odean, 
2008), information releases by management  are more heavily scrutinised and therefore 
demand increased accuracy (Collins, Kothari, & Rayburn, 1987) and higher levels of 
institutional ownership drives the release of information (Duggal & Millar, 1999). Therefore 
by adjusting for size deciles, the results should alleviate issues with regards to the size of the 
firm and also controls for the high positive correlation between size and analyst following; 
larger firms have greater analyst coverage (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). 
Therefore H3 was used to remove the impact size may have had on the returns.   
𝐻3𝐴 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻3𝐵 ∶ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
Research has shown that analysts can be experts within particular industries, but that this may 
not transfer as successfully to the specific firms that they are covering (Kadan et al., 2012).  
Brown et al. (2016) found that buy-side analysts did not value the stock recommendations of 
sell-side analysts, but cared very highly about their industry expertise. Therefore H4 adjusts 
the returns of the firm being recommended over the same timeframe by the returns of firms 
that share the same Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. In doing this industry effects 
can be removed from the returns. 
𝐻4𝐴 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
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𝐻4𝐵 ∶ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠, 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
Next, to adequately test the theory of decreased market reaction to analyst recommendations 
after the GFC, further adjustments to the hypotheses are required. The motivation behind these 
hypothesises is based on the theory that there is now an increased degree of pessimism by the 
market with regards to the actions banks/brokage firms took during the GFC; which will be 
reflected in a loss of confidence in analysts forecasts. This pessimism drives the markets to 
place less weight on the recommendations of analysts when choosing an investment; leading 
to an overall decline in reactivity. This justification is supported by the research of Earle (2009), 
Shiller (2012) and Gillespie and Hurley (2013). However given the research regarding loss 
aversion (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and reaction asymmetry 
(Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard, 2006; Soroka, 2006; Booth, Martikainen and Tse, 1997) it is 
hypothesized that the market will now be more inclined to follow the recommendation to sell 
stock.   
𝐻5𝐴 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐺𝐹𝐶   
𝐻5𝐵 ∶ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐺𝐹𝐶  
This would be reflected in less (more) positive (negative) returns following positive (negative) 
recommendations from analysts.  
Finally, the research is extended by the same adjustments as in hypothesise 2, 3 and 4; 
following the same rationale that these factors could also be used to explain the return 
deviations. It is expected that even after these factors are accounted for the returns will be lower 
following the GFC.  
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𝐻6𝐴 ∶ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐺𝐹𝐶, 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
𝐻6𝐵 ∶ 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐺𝐹𝐶, 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦  𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The next chapter details the data and research design that is used to test these hypotheses.  
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Chapter 4 – Data and Design  
4.1 - Data  
 
The data used is daily stock returns of the NYSE and NASDAQ between January 1st 2002 and 
March 31st 2016, sourced from CRSP. The dataset is focussed around the GFC, capturing years 
before and after the crisis. The dataset begins in 2002 to mitigate the impact the Dotcom Bubble 
and its subsequent burst which had a sizeable impact on the stock market of the time (Kraay & 
Ventura, 2007), and is not the target timeframe of this research. The data then reaches forward 
to 2016 as to capture the most recent financial data available.  
For modelling purposes the dataset is separated in pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC 
periods. Following the GFC timeframe definitions of Bekaet et al. (2014), Dungey and Gajurel 
(2015) and Dungey et al. (2015) the pre-GFC period encompasses January 2002 to December 
2006, whilst January 2007 to December 2009 covers the GFC itself and January 2010 onward 
represents the post-GFC period.  
In addition to the daily stock returns, analysts’ recommendations have been sourced 
from Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S). This dataset provides 
the recommendation itself, alongside the release date of the recommendation. The 
recommendations were then matched to the associated firm based on Stock Ticker and CUSIP 
code, and the dates of the announcement. This matching yielded a total sample size of 428,295 
recommendations across 8,873 separate firms for the 15 year sample window, observation 
breakdowns can be found in Table 4.1.  
I/B/E/S reports recommendations in five categories, 1) Strong Buy, 2) Buy, 3) Hold, 4) 
Underperform and 5) Sell. However, as per the research of Kadan et al. (2012) these categories 
were combined to create 1) Buy, consisting of Strong Buy and Buy recommendations, 2) Hold, 
consisting of all Hold recommendations and 3) Sell, consisting of Underperform and Sell 
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recommendations. These recommendations indicated an optimistic, neutral and pessimistic 
view of the reported firm’s future prospects from the broker. Moving forward these three 
recommendation classifications will be used. 
The sample shows a definitive optimistic bias in the recommendations that analyst’s 
issue. Over the sample period 46.5% of the recommendations were to buy firms, 44.4% were 
to hold existing stock, with only 9.0% of recommendations being negative and suggesting a 
sale. This is in-line with existing literature that all suggests a positive bias from sell-side 
analysts; with the major explanation being exclusive access to management by issuing positive 
recommendations (Fried and Givoly, 1982; O’Brien, 1988; Biddle and Ricks, 1988; Butler and 
Lang, 1991; Brown, 1993; Gu and Wu, 2003).    
In-order to be able to test hypothesise 3 and 6 firm size decile data was sourced through 
a separate CRSP size decile dataset that categorised firms into one of ten size deciles. The firm 
deciles were then matched to their respective firms based on Stock Ticker and CUSIP code, 
this is a similar approach as conducted in Brown and Warner (1985). Instances where firms 
could not be matched to their corresponding size decile due to missing observations in either 
dataset were dropped, the total number of observations can be found in Table 4.1. The returns 
for each decile were calculated to allow for return data to be adjusted by the corresponding size 
decile of the firm.   
Finally, to test hypothesise 4 and 6 the relevant Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code was required to be matched to the firm. The SIC data is not found within the CRSP dataset 
and was therefore matched based on Stock Ticker and CUSIP code from the COMPUSTAT 
dataset, the same approach used by Womack (1996). When the returns of the firms cannot be 
matched to the COMPUSTAT dataset they were dropped, the total number of observations can 
be found in Table 4.1. The returns for each of the SIC codes were then calculated as to allow 
return adjustments for the related industry of the firm.  
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The matching process and subsequent dropping of observations with incomplete 
information does result in the removal of a high number of returns. However, this was a 
necessary step as the returns that were dropped did not have complete information and could 
have created unwanted noise in the sample. Despite the dropping of observations the sample 
for size and industry adjusted returns still yielded observations of 331,153 and 205,869 
respectively; this information is displayed in Panel B of Table 4.1.17 
                                                          
17 No changes were required to the number of observations after market adjusted were taken as the 
market return data is found within the same CRSP dataset.  
- 29 - 
 
Table 4.1: Numbers of Observations  
This table represent the numbers of observations from the dataset. Panel A displays the annualised numbers of observations based on raw returns and the associated proportions that each recommendation makes up of 
the total number of recommendations. Panel B highlights the changing the number of observations over the entire sample period when the adjustments to the returns are made. The differences stems from the matching 
across datasets and with that the removal of incomplete observations to avoid the impact of potential noise.  
Panel A: Annualised Number of Raw Return Observations  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Buy  22,552 14,693  14,335  13,384  13,970  14,395  14,262  12,706  13,719  14,697  12,591  11,629  12,568  11,664  2,138 199,303  
 50.7% 42.9% 45.1% 45.5% 44.3% 45.9% 42.4% 43.3% 49.0% 50.2% 46.1% 46.8% 51.9% 49.0% 42.8% 46.5% 
Sell  3,971   3,711   2,950   2,611   2,943   2,670   4,030   3,464   2,026   2,219   2,315   1,936   1,524   1,823   559   38,752  
 8.9% 10.8% 9.3% 8.9% 9.3% 8.5% 12.0% 11.8% 7.2% 7.6% 8.5% 7.8% 6.3% 7.7% 11.2% 9.0% 
Hold 17,988  15,863  14,519  13,390  14,631  14,264  15,362  13,203  12,233  12,359  12,403  11,305  10,102  10,318  2,300  190,240  
 40.4% 46.3% 45.7% 45.6% 46.4% 45.5% 45.6% 44.9% 43.7% 42.2% 45.4% 45.5% 41.8% 43.3% 46.0% 44.4% 
                 
Total 44,511  34,267  31,804  29,385  31,544  31,329  33,654  29,373  27,978  29,275  27,309  24,870  24,194  23,805  4,997  428,295  
 
 
Panel B: Number of Observations by Adjustments  
 Buy Sell Hold Total 
Raw Return Observations  199,303 38,752 190,240 428,295 
Market Adjusted Returns Observations 199,303 38,752 190,240 428,295 
Size Adjusted Returns Observations 152,148 30,508 148,497 331,153 
Industry Adjusted Returns Observations 96,212 18,720 90,937 205,869 
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4.2 - Research Design  
 
The research design examines the cumulative returns based on the day proceeding the 
announcement date of a recommendation. The cumulative returns are calculated by 
compounding the returns each day to measure the total return over the given timeframe, as per 
the approach of Womack (1996). The cumulative return models are calculated at 1, 5, 30, 60, 
90, 120, 180 and 252 day periods following the recommendation release date. In doing so the 
returns can be tracked at regular intervals to see their progression and to observe the timeframe 
of market reaction  
Consensus of analysts were formed on a daily basis. Wherein the majority analyst 
recommendation for the day considered. This was to lower potential noise in the results 
stemming from mixed recommendations on given days. For example, should a day see the 
release of two analyst buy recommendation and one hold recommendation, this day will be 
considered a day whereby consensus was to buy. To further eliminate noise in the results, days 
where no consensus could be reached were removed from the dataset; for example a day which 
saw two buy recommendations and two hold recommendations issued for the same firm would 
be dropped as it is unclear as to what the overall opinion of analysts is, it is mixed. Under this 
system investors in the real-world would only be required to view the consensus on that given 
day to determine the trading strategy that they were to implement, making it an easy trading 
strategy to implement. 
Adjusted raw return models are then controlled by market, size and industry movements 
to assess the excess returns that one could attain should they follow the recommendation of an 
analyst. The excess returns calculation takes the raw returns over the given period and subtracts 
the returns of the market adjustment factor. These returns are then averaged to find the average 
return of the given adjustment.  
- 31 - 
 
As per the research of Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) using 
compounded market returns on any approach other than the value-weighted (VW) index 
portfolio induces an upward bias in returns. The use of VW adjustments also follows the 
approach of many seminal finance papers such as, Banz (1981), Basu (1983) and Brown and 
Warner (1985), among many others.  
Thus creating the following model:  
𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑖 =  [ ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖) − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡
+1
𝑡=+1
)
+1
𝑡=+1
] 
Where 𝑡 is the market trading day relative to the recommendation day (t=0), 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is the raw return 
on stock 𝑖 across time 𝑡, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 is the return on the matching CRSP VW index portfolio 
over the return timeframe. Then, the portfolio excess return, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡, is calculated as the 
average of the 𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑖: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
(∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
Where 𝑛 equal the number of sample firms in the event period with available returns. Returns 
are calculated as such for each timeframe. 18 It is this model that will be used in the testing of 
hypothesises 2 and 6.  
The use of market adjusted returns assesses the analysts’ recommendation performance 
relative to how the market performed over the same period. The markets behaviour, whether 
that be through upward bull markets or downward bear markets can have a dramatic impact on 
the overall returns following an analysts recommendation (Siganos & Chelley-Steeley, 2006). 
Pre-GFC (post-GFC) bull (bear) markets need to be considered when assessing the ability of 
                                                          
18 Those representing 1, 5, 30, 60, 90, 120, 180 and 252 days following the announcement of a 
recommendation.  
Equation 1.1 
Equation 1.2 
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analysts’ recommendations as these market conditions naturally see more positive (negative) 
returns.  
Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) found a significant difference in the returns of large firms 
comparative to smaller firms listed on the NYSE. Hence, to eliminate potential threats to the 
robustness of the research stemming from a size effect the impact is adjusted. The size-adjusted 
excess returns, 𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑖, subtract the appropriate CRSP market capitalisation decile cumulative 
returns from the raw cumulative returns of the firm with a recommendation, over the given 
period. Thus creating the respective model: 
𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑖 =  [ ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖) − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+1
𝑡=+1
)
+1
𝑡=+1
] 
Where 𝑡 is the market trading day relative to the recommendation day (t=0), 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is the raw return 
on stock 𝑖 across time 𝑡, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the return on the matching CRSP market capitalisation 
size decile for day 𝑡. Then, the portfolio excess return, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, is the mean of the 𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑖: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =  
1
𝑛
(∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
Where 𝑛 equal the number of sample firms in the event period with available returns. Returns 
are calculated as such for each timeframe. However not all firms are captured within this dataset 
fully, with some observations missing.19 It is this model that will be used in the testing of 
hypothesises 3 and 6. 
As firm’s performance increases (decreases) as does the performance of many other 
firms within same industry, hence there is an industry effect on returns (Gupta, 1969). Many 
studies (Martin and McConnell, 1991; Opler and Titman, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) 
                                                          
19 For example days of trading data could be absent from either dataset.  
Equation 2.1 
Equation 2.2 
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have adjusted their return models by the industry of the respective firm to eliminate such a 
factor. Research from Brown et al. (2016) also suggests that sell-side analysts may have 
superior industry knowledge, but that may not translate as absolutely to their firm specific 
knowledge. Therefore analysts may be very knowledgeable about changing market condition 
and the rise (fall) of industries, but the exact firm that will outperform in the industry may not 
be as accurate.  
As per Womack (1996) the method used for industry adjustment is to match the 
cumulative returns of the recommended firm to the cumulative returns over the same period of 
firms with the same SIC code. Therefore following the same approach with the prior 
adjustments the following models were used: 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑖 =  [ ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖) − ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+1
𝑡=+1
)
+1
𝑡=+1
] 
Where 𝑡 is the market trading day relative to the recommendation day (t=0), 𝑟𝑡
𝑖 is the raw return 
on stock 𝑖 across time 𝑡, and 𝑟𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
 is the return on the matching SIC code from the data for 
day 𝑡. Then, the portfolio excess return, 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦, is the mean of the 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑖: 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 =  
1
𝑛
(∑ 𝐸𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
Where 𝑛 equal the number of sample firms in the event period with available returns. Returns 
are calculated as such for each timeframe. It is this model that will be used in the testing of 
hypothesises 4 and 6. 
By adjusting for multiple factors the conclusions that can be drawn in regards to market 
reaction are more robust. Any announcements that impact similar firms will be adjusted for, as 
a result the shifts will be reflective of the analyst recommendations, not more widespread 
Equation 3.2 
Equation 3.1 
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changes that may impact the market or industry of the firm. If excess returns are still achievable, 
given the return adjustments, a relationship between analysts’ recommendations and market 
reactions will be evident.  
However, the above models only highlight excess returns that may, or may not, be 
achievable when following the recommendation of an analyst, they do not address any potential 
changes in market reactivity following the GFC. To assess the impact that the GFC had on the 
returns, and adjusted returns, and the hypothesised decrease in market reactivity following the 
GFC the following regression model was designed: 
𝑅𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 
Where 𝑅𝑖 represents the raw returns of the firm following the recommendation. Where 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡finds the difference between the raw returns and the returns of the market over the 
same time, 𝑡. Where 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 finds the difference between the raw returns and the returns of 
the same size decile over the same time, 𝑡. Where 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 finds the difference between 
the raw returns and the returns of the same SIC Code over the same time, 𝑡. Where 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 
represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are after 
the GFC. Where 𝑡 represents the timeframe of the modelled returns. Given this model it is 
expected that the coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 is negative and significant, indicating that the 
returns of the post-GFC recommendations are lower than that of the pre-GFC 
recommendations. With the argument of the decrease in reaction stemming from a decrease in 
trust between the market and the financial institutions issuing the recommendations. 
Equation 4.1 
Equation 4.2 
Equation 4.3 
Equation 4.4 
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The purpose of the adjustments are to lower threats to the validity of the papers findings. 
The raw returns may show declined returns following the GFC, but if all returns are lower 
following the GFC then this does not support the argument of decreased reactivity to 
recommendations, the market is just lower. Hence by making these adjustments the results of 
the paper can be attributed to the proposed argument, declined trust.  
 The next chapter applies these models and generates the empirical results of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5 – Empirical Results  
5.1 - Overall Results  
 
The results section has been separated to first analyse the raw and market adjusted returns, 
followed by the size and industry adjusted over the entire sample period; in testing across the 
entire sample timeframe we can assess to what degree the market reacts to analysts’ 
recommendations. This is a necessary step that must be taken before judging the impact of the 
GFC; if returns were not present at all, the isolation of the GFC would not provide any 
worthwhile information.  
The declining number of observations that can be seen from time t+1 to t+252 is a result 
of missing return data. The CRSP dataset reports missing values for prices and returns on days 
where trading may have been suspended for firms; creating instances with no data (Ince & 
Porter, 2006). If return data is missing over the 252 days following a recommendations then 
the returns are dropped from the dataset as to not create unwanted noise from missing 
observations.  
Firstly the raw cumulative returns following an analyst’s buy recommendation of the 
entire sample are found to be significantly different from 0, with a p-value < 0.0001, at all time 
periods, that being t+1, t+5, t+30, t+60, t+90, t+120, t+180, t+252; where t=0 represents the 
announcement date of the recommendation. These returns accumulate over the 252 trading 
days to create a positive raw return of 22.080%. Therefore by following this simple strategy of 
buying when an analyst advises can gain investors returns of over 22%.   
Given the adjustment for the market returns over the entire sample reveals returns that 
are understandably more subdued than the raw returns, however remain significant. The market 
adjusted returns are significant, p-value < 0.0001, from period t+30 onward. These results lead 
to a positive cumulative market adjusted return at t+252 of 12.390%. The raw return and market 
- 37 - 
 
adjusted returns over the entire period can be found in Panel A of Table 5.1. These findings 
support hypothesises 1A and 2A. 
Table 5.1: Raw and Market Adjusted Returns Following Recommendations 
This table represent the raw and market adjusted returns that can be achieved by following the recommendations of analysts’ reports. Column 
1 represents the days following the recommendations and acts as the timeframe of the recommendations. Column 2 is the number of 
recommendations that were issued by analysts. Column 3 relates to the raw holding period return (HPR) and their significance on the relative 
day proceeding a recommendation. Column 4 is the market adjusted holding period return (HPR) and their significance on the relative day 
proceeding a recommendation. Panel A displays the returns following buy recommendations, Panel B displays the returns following sell 
recommendations and Panel C displays the returns following hold recommendations. 
Panel A: Buy Recommendation Reactions  
Days (t+n) Observations Raw HPR Market Adjusted HPR 
1 199,303 
 
-0.033% 
(<.0001) 
0.014% 
(0.0508) 
5 198,510 -0.079% 
(<.0001) 
0.000% 
(0.9098) 
30 189,505 1.020% 
(<.0001) 
0.412% 
(<.0001) 
60 185,466 3.020% 
(<.0001) 
1.660% 
(<.0001) 
90 181,597 5.430% 
(<.0001) 
3.120% 
(<.0001) 
120 177,970 8.190% 
(<.0001) 
4.800% 
(<.0001) 
180 168,325 14.450% 
(<.0001) 
8.100% 
(<.0001) 
252 161,554 22.080% 
(<.0001) 
12.390% 
(<.0001) 
 
 
Panel B: Sell Recommendation Reactions 
Days (t+n) Observations Raw HPR Market Adjusted HPR 
1 38,752 0.016% 
(0.4643) 
0.028% 
(0.1635) 
5 38,701 0.322% 
(<.0001) 
0.135% 
(0.0035) 
30 38,486 1.610% 
(<.0001) 
0.501% 
(<.0001) 
60 38,091 0.931% 
(<.0001) 
-0.328% 
(0.0155) 
90 37,809 0.015% 
(0.9369) 
-1.450% 
(<.0001) 
120 37,479 -0.283% 
(0.1844) 
-2.070% 
(<.0001) 
180 35,749 1.230% 
(<.0001) 
-2.270% 
(<.0001) 
252 33,894 4.210% 
(0.033) 
-2.040% 
(<.0001) 
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Panel C: Hold Recommendation Reactions 
Days (t+n) Observations Raw HPR Market Adjusted HPR 
1 190,240 -0.008% 
(0.3599) 
0.010% 
(0.1976) 
5 189,857 0.022% 
(<.0001) 
0.087% 
(<.0001) 
30 186,454 1.560% 
(<.0001) 
0.049% 
(<.0001) 
60 184,127 2.430% 
(<.0001) 
0.776% 
(<.0001) 
90 181,834 3.070% 
(<.0001) 
0.746% 
(<.0001) 
120 179,396 4.240% 
(<.0001) 
1.230% 
(<.0001) 
180 171,701 7.970% 
(<.0001) 
2.600% 
(<.0001) 
252 164,486 13.240% 
(<.0001) 
4.660% 
(<.0001) 
  
The raw returns following sell recommendations are not as definitive as the buy 
recommendations. The t+252 raw returns indicate a positive return of 4.210%, which runs 
contrary to the negative returns hypothesised in H1B. Therefore suggesting that despite 
analyst’s belief that the firm is going to underperform, its stock performance on average still 
accumulates to be positive.  
However, when adjusted by the CRSP market index the sell recommendations now 
reveals significantly negative returns. When adjusted for the market these returns fall to.                            
-2.040% at t+252, suggesting that given the market conditions there is comparative benefit 
from following analysts sell recommendations, just less so than buy recommendations. 
Therefore the results of this test support H2B. The raw return and market adjusted returns over 
the entire period for sell recommendations can be found in Panel B of Table 5.1.  
Finally, the results of hold recommendations over the entire sample reveal positive 
returns of 13.240% and 4.660% for raw and market adjusted returns respectively at t+252, both 
significant at the 0.01% level. These positive returns support the claims of H1A and H2A. This 
indicates that despite analyst’s hesitation in issuing a definitive buy or sell recommendation, 
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firms that gain the interest and subsequent coverage of analysts are still able to beat the market. 
The raw return and market adjusted returns over the entire period for hold recommendations 
can be found in Panel C of Table 5.1.  
The results from Table 5.1 also indicate that there is a slow reaction to the release of 
analyst’s recommendations. It appears that much of the retunes develop over the post 
recommendation announcement timeframe.  
Next the returns were adjusted for the size and the industry of the firm. When these 
adjustments are made returns are still significant, as hypothesised in hypothesises 3 and 4. 
There is a clear and distinct decrease in the number of observations between the size and 
industry adjusted data to the raw and market adjusted. This decrease in observations stems from 
the matching process required to generate the size and industry returns, as explained in Chapter 
4.2.  
Positive returns at t+252 of 4.170% and 3.110% are evident following buy 
recommendations when the returns are adjusted for size and industry respectively; these returns 
are significant at the 0.01% level. The size return and industry adjusted returns over the entire 
period for buy recommendations can be found in Panel A of Table 5.2. These findings support 
hypothesises 3A and 4A. 
 As with the market adjusted return, the returns following sell recommendations are 
negative when size and industry are adjusted for. The cumulative returns of these adjustments 
at t+252 are.-9.020% and -6.160% for size and industry adjustments respectively; supporting 
H3B and H4B. The size return and industry adjusted returns over the entire period for sell 
recommendations can be found in Panel B of Table 5.2. 
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 Table 5.2: Size and Industry Adjusted Returns Following Recommendations 
This table represent the size and industry adjusted returns that can be achieved by following the recommendations of analysts’ reports. Column 
1 represents the days following the recommendations and acts as the timeframe of the recommendations. Column 2 is the number of 
recommendations that were issued by analysts and which could then be matched to the relevant CRSP size decile. Column 3 relates to the size 
adjusted holding period return (HPR) and their significance on the relative day proceeding a recommendation. Column 4 lists the number of 
recommendations that could matched to the corresponding SIC code of the firm found through the COMPUSTAT dataset. Column 5 is the 
industry adjusted holding period return (HPR) and their significance on the relative day proceeding a recommendation. Panel A displays the 
returns following buy recommendations, Panel B displays the returns following sell recommendations and Panel C displays the returns 
following hold recommendations. 
Panel A: Buy Recommendation Reactions 
Days (t+n) Observations Size Adjusted HPR Observations Industry Adjusted HPR 
1 152,148 -0.033% 
(<.0001) 
96,212 0.002% 
(0.8537) 
5 152,148 -0.222% 
(<.0001) 
96,212 -0.018% 
(0.3451) 
30 151,906 -0.518% 
(<.0001) 
94,220 -0.065% 
(0.1309) 
60 151,606 0.049% 
(0.3855) 
91,515 0.286% 
(<.0001) 
90 151,266 0.896% 
(<.0001) 
89,898 0.949% 
(<.0001) 
120 150,866 1.700% 
(<.0001) 
88,287 1.440% 
(<.0001) 
180 149,452 3.040% 
(<.0001) 
84,251 2.270% 
(<.0001) 
252 145,386 4.170% 
(<.0001) 
80,095 3.110% 
(<.0001) 
 
 
Panel B: Sell Recommendation Reactions 
Days (t+n) Observations Size Adjusted HPR Observations Industry Adjusted HPR 
1 30,508 0.018% 
(0.4568) 
18,720 -0.002% 
(0.1635) 
5 30,508 0.210% 
(0.0001) 
18,720 -0.019% 
(0.0035) 
30 30,505 0.547% 
(<.0001) 
18,613 0.100% 
(<.0001) 
60 30,486 -0.829% 
(<.0001) 
18,434 0.286% 
(0.0155) 
90 30,454 -2.350% 
(<.0001) 
18,332 -1.740% 
(<.0001) 
120 30,418 -3.810% 
(<.0001) 
18,191 -2.900% 
(<.0001) 
180 30,305 -6.560% 
(<.0001) 
17,443 -4.690% 
(<.0001) 
252 29,612 -9.020% 
(<.0001) 
16,308 -6.160% 
(<.0001) 
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 Finally, when hold recommendations are adjusted for the size and industry of the firm 
the returns become negative, contrary to H3A and H4A. These results conflict with the research 
of Brown et al. (2016), showing that analysts may be more accurate at identify firms that are 
going to outperform similar firms within the same industry. It appears that when analysts have 
the confidence to issue a buy recommendation the returns that follow are positive, unlike when 
analysts are more tentative about a firm and issue a hold recommendation. The size return and 
industry adjusted returns over the entire period for hold recommendations can be found in Panel 
C of Table 5.2. 
The results from Table 5.2 once more indicate a slow reaction to the release of analyst’s 
recommendations. As with raw and market adjusted returns positive growth in returns 
following a positive recommendation is still evident 252 days following its release. These 
results indicate that the market is likely not reacting to the recommendation itself, but additional 
information that is released to the market over the 252 days.  
Therefore it appears that by following the recommendations of analysts investors would 
be able to achieve to positive returns on buy recommendations even after adjusting for the 
Panel C: Hold Recommendation Reactions 
Days (t+n) Observations Size Adjusted HPR Observations Industry Adjusted HPR 
1 148,497 0.029% 
(0.0015) 
90,937 0.002% 
(0.1976) 
5 148,497 0.183% 
(<.0001) 
90,937 0.030% 
(<.0001) 
30 148,408 0.424% 
(<.0001) 
90,942 0.084% 
(<.0001) 
60 148,246 0.129% 
(0.0338) 
88,600 -0.109% 
(<.0001) 
90 148,044 -0.393% 
(<.0001) 
87,603 -0.508% 
(<.0001) 
120 146,874 -0.887% 
(<.0001) 
86,468 -0.745% 
(<.0001) 
180 146,874 -1.630% 
(<.0001) 
83,198 -1.190% 
(<.0001) 
252 143,431 -2.250% 
(<.0001) 
78,985 -1.760% 
(<.0001) 
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various parameters above. Negative returns can be avoided relative to the market, size and 
industry for sell recommendations by following the advice of analysts to sell these stocks. With 
hold recommendations only producing positive raw and market adjusted returns; they are 
however less positive than but recommendations; which was somewhat to be expected. 
Table 5.3 allows for comparison of returns following analyst’s recommendations before 
and after the GFC. The results suggest that the raw and market adjusted returns on buy 
recommendations are lower, whilst returns following size and industry adjustments are 
relatively mixed.  
Sell recommendations appear to deliver positive raw returns, both before and after the 
GFC. However, after these raw returns are adjusted by the size, industry and market they 
become negative in both time periods. These results suggest that analysts have the ability to 
select firms that are going to underperform relative to similar firms and the rest of the market 
and that this ability is evident before and after the crisis. Returns in the period following the 
GFC appear more negative than they did before the crisis, suggesting that the market is now 
taking greater note of the opinions of analysts.  
Finally, hold recommendations appear lower across raw and adjusted returns. This falls 
in-line with the predications of H5 that following the GFC the recommendations of analysts 
may not be as well received as before the crisis. 
When analysing the return data following recommendations it appears that much of the 
growth in returns does not come from the short-term as proposed by Fama (1970) but with it 
coming in the medium to longer term periods of time. This could stem from the analysts close 
access to management, who provide the analysts with privileged information before it becomes 
public (Zitzewitz, 2001a; Zitzewitz, 2002; Keskek et al., 2013). With analysts able to gain early 
access they can adjust their valuations to reflect the future information. The content of this 
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privileged information is then released to the market at a later date with the market responding 
accordingly. Furthermore, much of the deviation between pre-GFC and post-GFC returns is 
also evident in the longer run.  
Table 4.1 suggests that there is no clear change in the number of recommendations that 
analysts are issuing since the GFC; with little-to-no deviation in types of recommendations 
being made. Yet the returns reflect a decline. It appears that there is no change in the number 
of recommendations, but a change in the perception of what these recommendations mean to 
the market.   
Table 5.4 represents the returns that would be possible to investors should they 
introduce various arbitrage strategies. The arbitrage positions would see the investors take up 
a short position in a security and a long in another at the time. Then after a given timeframe the 
investor would sell the long position and use the returns generate to repay the short position; 
profiting on the difference. The tables show that when holding aggressive20, moderate21, and 
conservative22  arbitrage positions, positive returns can be made, both before and after the GFC. 
The results show that across the strategies the returns in the short-run are higher for the pre-
GFC timeframe. Though, as the increased negative returns associated with the sell 
recommendations increases over the timeframes the raw arbitrage profits rise in the longer run. 
However, after the market factor adjustments are made the returns shift once more. When 
adjusting for the market the returns of the pre-GFC arbitrage position are greater than those of 
the post-GFC, with the size and industry adjustments showing little variation following the 
crisis. Therefore whilst the returns of the arbitrage positions are positive beyond 60 days both 
                                                          
20 Consisting of a long buy position following a buy recommendations against a short position in a sell 
recommendation. 
21 Consisting of a long buy and hold positions following a buy and hold recommendations against a 
short position in a sell recommendations. 
22 Consisting of a long hold position following a hold recommendations against a short position in a sell 
recommendation. 
- 44 - 
 
before and after the crisis, it appears that the market conditions explain the increases in the 
profitably of arbitrage strategies that target analyst recommendations post-GFC.  
The question regarding changes in market reactivity to analyst recommendations after 
the GFC will be discussed further in Chapter 5.2. This section will apply regression analysis to 
determine if there is a significant difference between the returns that are achieved when 
following the recommendation of analysts before the GFC comparative to after the crisis.  
- 45 - 
 
Table 5.3: Pre-GFC and Post-GFC Returns, Given Raw and Adjusted Returns 
This table represent a comparison between the returns following an analyst’s recommendation before and after the GFC. Column 1 represents the days following the recommendations and acts as the timeframe of the 
recommendations. Column 2 represent the raw returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 3 represent the raw returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 4 represent the market 
adjusted returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 5 represent the market adjusted returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 6 represent the size adjusted returns following the 
recommendation before the GFC. Column 7 represent the size adjusted returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 8 represent the industry adjusted returns following the recommendation before the 
GFC. Column 9 represent the industry adjusted returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Panel A displays the returns following buy recommendations, Panel B displays the returns following sell 
recommendations and Panel C displays the returns following hold recommendations.  
 
 
Panel A: Buy Recommendations   
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 0.008% 0.031% 0.045% 0.027% -0.022% -0.039% -0.004% 0.017% 
 (0.4363) (0.0041) (<.0001) (0.0043) (0.0493) (0.0007) (0.7566) (0.1756) 
5 0.026% 0.147% 0.080% 0.018% -0.177% -0.212% -0.008% -0.015% 
 (0.2594) (<.0001) (0.0001) (0.3705) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7750) (0.5564) 
30 1.380% 2.020% 0.620% 0.458% -0.514% -0.625% 0.020% -0.162% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7469) (0.0076) 
60 3.550% 4.680% 2.080% 1.560% -0.204% 0.015% 0.358% 0.172% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0115) (0.8540) (<.0001) (0.0530) 
90 5.960% 7.410% 3.650% 2.870% 0.497% 0.831% 1.020% 0.773% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
120 9.430% 9.970% 5.760% 4.250% 1.170% 1.690% 1.480% 1.230% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 17.920% 15.260% 9.730% 7.270% 2.400% 3.060% 2.100% 2.210% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 27.600% 22.290% 14.850% 11.280% 3.710% 3.780% 2.820% 3.010% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Panel B: Sell Recommendations 
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 0.050% 0.106% 0.049% 0.019% -0.006% 0.033% 0.027% -0.036% 
 (0.0846) (0.0011) (0.0763) (0.5254) (0.8242) (0.3443) (0.4527) (0.2715) 
5 0.348% 0.688% 0.061% 0.234% 0.056% 0.310% -0.033% -0.034% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3277) (0.0006) (0.3974) (0.0001) (0.6921) (0.6350) 
30 1.580% 3.910% 0.023% 1.420% 0.224% 0.911% -0.159% 0.370% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8640) (<.0001) (0.1196) (<.0001) (0.3489) (0.0240) 
60 1.260% 4.360% -0.709% 0.670% -0.650% -0.719% -1.080% -0.291% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0017) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1871) 
90 0.369% 4.140% -1.860% -0.185% -1.720% -2.400% -2.250% -1.110% 
 (0.1474) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4647) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
120 1.050% 3.480% -2.010% -1.060% -2.600% -4.200% -3.460% -2.130% 
 (0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 6.160% 2.530% -0.583% -2.360% -5.110% -7.190% -4.880% -4.220% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0613) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 13.270% 4.270% -1.380% -2.500% -7.980% -8.610% -5.790% -6.010% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Panel C: Hold Recommendations 
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 0.000% 0.089% -0.002% 0.048% 0.019% 0.034% 0.001% -0.009% 
 (0.9830) (<.0001) (0.8178) (<.0001) (0.0961) (0.0119) (0.9299) (0.5339) 
5 0.216% 0.497% 0.056% 0.158% 0.175% 0.157% 0.022% 0.028% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0111) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4341) (0.3399) 
30 1.770% 3.090% 0.402% 0.918% 0.497% 0.465% 0.077% 0.114% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2415) (0.0839) 
60 3.060% 4.610% 0.959% 1.100% 0.361% 0.102% -0.036% -0.123% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2454) (0.7018) (0.1763) 
90 3.740% 5.790% 1.080% 1.040% -0.054% -0.432% -0.357% -0.562% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5823) (<.0001) (0.0020) (<.0001) 
120 5.610% 6.720% 1.950% 1.310% -0.518% -0.975% -0.532% -0.822% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 11.910% 9.140% 4.441% 2.110% -1.140% -1.810% -0.811% -1.410% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 19.760% 13.730% 7.600% 3.930% -1.750% -2.320% -1.400% -1.890% 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.4: Pre-GFC and Post-GFC Arbitrage Returns, Given Raw and Adjusted Returns 
This table represent a comparison between the arbitrage returns following varies strategies before and after the GFC. The arbitrage returns are the difference between he negative returns on the short position and the 
positive returns on the long position. Panel A displays the returns following an aggressive arbitrage position in-which investors would long buy position following a buy recommendations against a short position in a sell 
recommendation. Panel B displays the returns following a moderate arbitrage position in-which investors would long buy and hold positions following a buy and hold recommendation against a short position in a sell 
recommendation. Panel C displays the returns following a conservative arbitrage position in-which investors would long hold position following a hold recommendations against a short position in a sell recommendation. 
Column 1 represents the days following the recommendations and acts as the timeframe of the recommendations. Column 2 represent the raw arbitrage returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 3 
represent the raw arbitrage returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 4 represent the market adjusted arbitrage returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 5 represent the market 
adjusted arbitrage returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 6 represent the size adjusted arbitrage returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 7 represent the size adjusted 
arbitrage returns following the recommendation after the GFC. Column 8 represent the industry adjusted arbitrage returns following the recommendation before the GFC. Column 9 represent the industry adjusted arbitrage 
returns following the recommendation after the GFC.  
 
Panel A: Aggressive Arbitrage Position (Long Buy Recommendations, Short Sell Recommendations)  
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 -0.04% -0.08% 0.00% 0.01% -0.02% -0.07% -0.03% 0.05% 
5 -0.32% -0.54% 0.02% -0.22% -0.23% -0.52% 0.03% 0.02% 
30 -0.20% -1.89% 0.60% -0.96% -0.74% -1.54% 0.18% -0.53% 
60 2.29% 0.32% 2.79% 0.89% 0.45% 0.73% 1.44% 0.46% 
90 5.59% 3.27% 5.51% 3.06% 2.22% 3.23% 3.27% 1.88% 
120 8.38% 6.49% 7.77% 5.31% 3.77% 5.89% 4.94% 3.36% 
180 11.76% 12.73% 10.31% 9.63% 7.51% 10.25% 6.98% 6.43% 
252 14.33% 18.02% 16.23% 13.78% 11.69% 12.39% 8.61% 9.02% 
Panel B: Moderate Arbitrage Position (Long Buy and Hold Recommendations, Short Sell Recommendations)   
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 -0.05% -0.05% -0.03% 0.02% 0.00% -0.04% -0.03% 0.04% 
5 -0.23% -0.37% 0.01% -0.15% -0.06% -0.34% 0.04% 0.04% 
30 -0.01% -1.36% 0.49% -0.73% -0.23% -0.99% 0.21% -0.39% 
60 2.05% 0.29% 2.23% 0.66% 0.73% 0.78% 1.24% 0.32% 
90 4.48% 2.46% 4.23% 2.14% 1.94% 2.60% 2.58% 1.22% 
120 6.47% 4.87% 5.87% 3.84% 2.93% 4.56% 3.93% 2.33% 
180 8.76% 9.67% 7.67% 7.05% 5.74% 7.82% 5.52% 4.62% 
252 10.41% 13.74% 12.61% 10.11% 8.96% 9.34% 6.50% 6.57% 
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Panel C: Conservative Arbitrage Position (Long Hold Recommendations, Short Sell Recommendations)  
Days (t+n) Raw HPR 
 
Pre-GFC 
Raw HPR 
 
Post-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Market 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Size Adjusted 
HPR 
Post-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Pre-GFC 
Industry 
Adjusted HPR 
Post-GFC 
1 -0.05% -0.02% -0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 0.03% 
5 -0.13% -0.19% -0.01% -0.08% 0.12% -0.15% 0.06% 0.06% 
30 0.19% -0.82% 0.38% -0.50% 0.27% -0.45% 0.24% -0.26% 
60 1.80% 0.25% 1.67% 0.43% 1.01% 0.82% 1.04% 0.17% 
90 3.37% 1.65% 2.94% 1.23% 1.67% 1.97% 1.89% 0.55% 
120 4.56% 3.24% 3.96% 2.37% 2.08% 3.23% 2.93% 1.31% 
180 5.75% 6.61% 5.02% 4.47% 3.97% 5.38% 4.07% 2.81% 
252 6.49% 9.46% 8.98% 6.43% 6.23% 6.29% 4.39% 4.12% 
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5.2 - Regression Results    
 
To test the impact of the GFC the variations on Equation 4 were ran across the different datasets 
to assess if a change had occurred. Table 5.5 outlines the results of the regression used in 
Equation 4.1 for raw return data. Should the coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and 
significant there is evidence to suggest that the market has a lower (higher) reaction to analysts’ 
positive (negative) recommendation following the GFC; wherein returns following the GFC 
are lower for the given recommendation.  
The raw return results do suggest that the market has a lower reaction to positive analyst 
recommendations in the years following the GFC across all of the time periods used. Thus 
these results support H5A. Additionally the reaction on sell recommendations appears to be 
greater than before the crisis; supporting the claim of H5B that the market will now follow 
negative reactions to a greater level. The raw return results from these regressions are in Table 
5.5. 
Hypothesis 6 was tested by using Equation 4.2; market adjusted returns. Once more 
should a decrease (increase) in reaction exist the coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 will be negative 
and significant. The results appear to fall in-line with the hypothesised predictions across all 
timeframes are recommendations, except hold recommendations at t+1; however as more time 
passes and the returns accumulate the relationship becomes evident. The findings suggest that 
even after movement in the market is adjusted for the market is still less (more) reactive to 
analysts’ positive (negative) recommendations following the GFC. The market adjusted return 
results can be found in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.5: Regression on Raw Returns 
This table represent the following model:  𝑅𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶. Where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of raw returns. The 
independent variable of the model is 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are 
following the GFC. Should the coefficient 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and significant the model suggests that the years following the GFC had 
lower returns than prior to the crisis. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold recommendations.  
Days (t+n) Coefficient           Buy         Sell        Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00110 0.00115 0.00153 
  (<.0001)       (0.0005) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00112 -0.00122 -0.00088 
  (<.0001) (0.0086) (<.0001) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00485 0.00729 0.00831 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00448 -0.00450 -0.00465 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.02716 0.03489 0.03685 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.01619 -0.01863 -0.01567 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.06441 0.06117 0.06856 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.03531 -0.04525 -0.03723 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.10000 0.07280 0.09002 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04585 -0.05148 -0.04497 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.14039 0.09347 0.11545 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.05937 -0.07092 -0.05791 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.20866 0.11288 0.15768 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.06584 -0.07264 -0.06162 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.29276 0.13624 0.21089 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04415 -0.01434 -0.02772 
  (<.0001) (0.0346) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.6: Regression on Market Adjusted Returns 
This table represent the following model: 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶. Where 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 is the dependant variable of market 
adjusted returns. The independent variable of the model is 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and 
subsequent returns are following the GFC. Should the coefficient 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and significant the model suggests that the years 
following the GFC had lower returns than prior to the crisis. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Hypothesis 6 was also tested, using Equation 4.3; size adjusted returns. Again, should 
a decrease (increase) in reaction following a positive (negative) recommendation exist the 
coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 will be negative and significant. The coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 is 
only significantly different from when the cumulative returns are calculated up to t+252 on buy 
and sell; across all other periods tested the coefficient remains insignificant. This indicates that 
the size of the firm could explain much of the decrease in reactivity; however not all of it. The 
Days (t+n) Coefficient          Buy         Sell        Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00054 0.00060 0.00036 
  (<.0001) (0.0371) (0.0020) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00061 -0.00111 -0.00023 
  (<.0001) (0.0107) (0.1749) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00152 0.00163 0.00176 
  (<.0001) (0.0121) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00223 -0.00278 -0.00150 
  (<.0001) (0.0045) (<.0001) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00851 0.00422 0.00829 
  (<.0001) (0.0029) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00942 -0.00837 -0.00585 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.02514 -0.00056 0.01570 
  (<.0001) (0.7801) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.02174 -0.01829 -0.01673 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.04209 -0.01190 0.01832 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.02868 -0.01361 -0.01913 
  (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.06530 -0.01326 0.02890 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04396 -0.03291 -0.03520 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.11122 0.00785 0.05939 
  (<.0001) (0.0232) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.06597 -0.07302 -0.06350 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.16988 0.03359 0.09760 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.08085 -0.08516 -0.07695 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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results suggest that the short term reaction to the recommendation can be explained by the size 
of the firm, however as time increases there is still an apparent reduction in returns following 
a recommendation after the GFC that cannot be explained by the size of the firm. The size 
adjusted return results can be found in Table 5.7.  
 Hypothesis 6 was finally tested by using Equation 4.4; industry adjusted returns. As 
with the prior models should a decrease in reaction exist the coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 will be 
negative and significant following positive (negative) recommendations by analysts.  
When the returns following a recommendation are adjusted for changes in the industry 
over the same period much of the decreased reactivity that was observed with the raw and 
market adjusted returns following the GFC disappears. The coefficients on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 are not 
significant across most of the timeframes, suggesting that there is little difference between pre-
GFC and post-GFC returns when they are adjusted for movements of firms in the same 
industry.  The tabulated results do show that some degrees of deviation between pre-GFC and 
post-GFC returns at varying timeframes, however this is not consistent. These results run 
contrary to H6 and suggest that perhaps industry effects were a large contributor the change in 
reactions to recommendations. The industry adjusted return results can be found in Table 5.8.  
Overall the results indicate that there was a decline (increase) in the market reaction to 
positive (negative) recommendations from analysts. However, adjustments to the results can 
help explain some of the deviation between pre-GFC and post-GFC returns. The next section 
of this thesis will build robustness tests onto of the models that have been worked to assess the 
impact of factors exogenous to the prior models. 
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Table 5.7: Regression on Size Adjusted Returns 
This table represent the following model:  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶. Where 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒  represents the dependant variable of size adjusted 
returns. The independent variable of the model is 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent 
returns are following the GFC. Should the coefficient 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and significant the model suggests that the years following the 
GFC had lower returns than prior to the crisis. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold recommendations. 
Days (t+n) Coefficient           Buy         Sell        Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.00025 -0.00010 0.00022 
  (0.0545) (0.7495) (0.1082) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00010 0.00000 0.00016 
  (0.5738) (0.9934) (0.4016) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.00189 0.000661 0.00181 
  (<.0001) (0.3745) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  0.00021 0.000481 -0.0003 
  (0.5661) (0.6470) (0.4473) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.00554 0.00369 0.00505 
  (<.0001) (0.0207) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  0.00038 -0.00152 0.00015 
  (0.6580) (0.4994) (0.8637) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.00234 -0.00428 0.00351 
  (0.0105) (0.0597) (0.0002) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  0.00151 -0.00347 -0.00116 
  (0.2116) (0.2794) (0.3556) 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00533 -0.01654 -0.00093 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4020) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00027 -0.00298 -0.00103 
  (0.8494) (0.4369) (0.4912) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.01287 -0.02612 -0.00602 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00052 -0.00787 -0.00109 
  (0.7562) (0.0725) (0.5263) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡         0.02549 -0.05184        -0.01225 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00209 -0.00549 -0.00238 
  (0.3160) (0.3080) (0.2569) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.03927 -0.08287 -0.01850 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00809 0.01246 -0.00237 
  (0.0014) (0.0497) (0.3391) 
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Table 5.8: Regression on Industry Adjusted Returns 
This table represent the following model:  𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶. Where 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
 represents the dependant variable of 
industry adjusted returns. The independent variable of the model is 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement 
and subsequent returns are following the GFC. The independent variables of the model are 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are following the GFC. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold 
recommendations. 
Days (t+n) Coefficient           Buy         Sell        Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.00004 0.00025 0.00002 
  (0.7594) (0.4808) (0.8832) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  0.00021 -0.00103 -0.00006 
  (0.2737) (0.0476) (0.7610) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00003 -0.00033 0.00013 
  (0.9202) (0.6873) (0.6749) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  0.00006 -0.00116 0.00006 
  (0.8796) (0.3405) (0.8890) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00077 -0.00211 0.00038 
  (0.2451) (0.2159) (0.5853) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00189 0.000381 0.00117 
  (0.0393) (0.8787) (0.2306) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00460 -0.01188 -0.00094 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3455) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00251 0.00302 0.00028 
  (0.0604) (0.3824) (0.8429) 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.01220 -0.02539 -0.00450 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00515 0.00879 0.00027 
  (0.0016) (0.0376) (0.8733) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.01754 -0.03895 -0.00635 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00583 0.01215 -0.00085 
  (0.0022) (0.0126) (0.6611) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.02351 -0.05445 -0.00863 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00218 0.0073 -0.00475 
  (0.3704) (0.2136) (0.0443) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.03075 -0.06367 -0.01464 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00132 0.00165 -0.00478 
  (0.6677) (0.8174) (0.0974) 
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5.3 - Robustness Tests 
 
In-order to control for chances that the results are driven by factors outside of what Equation 4 
(in its various forms), additional tests are performed to increase the robustness of the results.  
Firstly, there is potential that changes in the levels of investor confidence could be a 
driving factor behind the decrease in market reaction, is it therefore appropriate to control by 
this. As mentioned previously the CCI is used as a measure of confidence within the market. 
The results show that even when controlling for the level of confidence in the market the results 
are not changed, with the coefficient on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  displaying the same results. For raw 
returns the post-GFC returns show a decrease (increase) in market reactivity following a 
positive (negative) recommendation across all timeframes beyond t+1. Whilst, when these 
returns are adjusted for the market movement over the same period the deviation does not 
become apparent until t+60; suggesting that the confidence of the market is more influential to 
the returns closer to the recommendation period. However the outcome of the regression on 
market adjusted returns still yields the same result as raw returns; decrease (increase) in returns 
following positive (negative) recommendations. Table 5.9 displays the results of the market 
confidence adjusted regressions. 
A second concern could be attributed to changes in the level of volatility within the 
market; and not the hypothesized trust breakdown. Therefore the volatility was controlled for 
by using the markets de facto measure the CBOE’s VIX (Brenner and Galai, 1989; Brenner 
and Galai, 1993; Whaley, 2000).  The returns from the VIX adjusted regression indicate that 
even when raw and market adjusted returns are further adjusted for volatility the coefficient on 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 is still negative and significant. Which again suggests that the returns following 
analysts’ positive (negative) recommendations are lower (higher). This once more adds 
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robustness of the findings as the decrease (increase) in reactivity cannot fully be attributed to 
the volatility of the market. Table 5.10 displays the results of the volatility adjusted regressions. 
Finally, the results were adjusted by the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model. 
The model used is ran on daily, monthly and annual returns and factors to capture as much 
information following the recommendation of an analyst. The five factor model hopes to 
describe the returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The model adjusts returns 
by 𝑆𝑀𝐵, which captures the returns on a diversified portfolio of small stocks less the returns 
that are made by a diversified portfolio of big stocks, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 covers the difference in returns of 
a diversified portfolio containing stocks that have high book-to-market ratios and low book-to-
market ratios, with the intent being to capture returns of value stock, 𝑅𝑀𝑊 is the difference 
between well diversified portfolios that have robust or weak profitability, finally 𝐶𝑀𝐴 which 
tracks the difference between the average returns of two conservative investment portfolios 
and two aggressive investment portfolios. The results show that even when adjusting for these 
factors the coefficients on 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 are still negative and significant indicating a decrease 
(increase) in the markets reaction to positive (negative) recommendations made by analysts. 
However the returns do indicate that size (proxied through SMB) was the most impactful factor 
of the model23; however SMB, along with the other factors, could not explain fully the decrease 
in market reactivity. The results of the Fama-French five-factor model can be found in Table 
5.11 
Therefore, these robustness tests show that despite numerous adjustments to the returns 
the results of the original models still stand true. It appears that following the GFC returns on 
buy, sell and hold recommendations are all lower which support the arguments of H5 and H6.  
                                                          
23 This supports the findings in size adjured return data of Table 5.7. 
- 58 - 
 
Table 5.9: Regression on the Returns with Controls for the Consumer Confidence Index 
This table represent the following models:  𝑅𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐼 across columns 3-5, where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of raw returns. Columns 6-8 display represent 𝑃𝐸𝑅
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐼, where 𝑃𝐸𝑅
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 represents the dependant variable of market adjusted returns. Where 𝐶𝐶𝐼 indicates the level of the confidence in the market measure through the Consumer Confidence Index, 
tracked across the recommendation period 𝑡. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are following the GFC. Should the coefficient 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and 
significant the model suggests that the years following the GFC had lower returns than prior to the crisis. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold recommendations.  
  Raw Returns Market Adjusted Returns  
Days (t+n) Coefficient  Buy Sell Hold Buy Sell Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.08278 0.03946 -0.02987 -0.02196 0.05317 0.01383 
  (<.0001) (0.1435) (0.0052) (0.0126) (0.0433) (0.1654) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00023 -0.00185 -0.00068 -0.00030 -0.00177 -0.00040 
  0.2868 (0.0014) (0.0041) (0.1149) (0.0012) (0.0575) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.000835 -0.00038 0.000312 0.00022 -0.00052 -0.00013 
  (<.0001) (0.1558) (0.0034) (0.0106) (0.0457) (0.1767) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.04587 0.18332 0.07870 -0.01822 0.05023 0.01205 
  (0.0235) (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.3199) (0.3935) (0.5629) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00460 -0.00753 -0.00654 -0.00197 -0.00338 -0.00164 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0056) (0.0002) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00051 -0.00175 -0.00070 0.00020 -0.00048 -0.00010 
  (0.0119) (0.0043) (0.0016) (0.2812) (0.4090) (0.6213) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.22281 0.81376 0.41031 0.01716 0.53152 0.29744 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.6856) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.01296 -0.03023 -0.02107 -0.00954 -0.01491 -0.00961 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00249 -0.00775 -0.00372 -0.00009 -0.00526 -0.00288 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8382) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.53669 1.77428 0.48873 0.13338 1.40150 0.65448 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0270) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.02972 -0.07009 -0.04575 -0.02318 -0.03547 -0.02494 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00600 -0.01704 -0.00418 -0.00108 -0.01398 -0.00637 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0726) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.8 Continued  
 
 
  
  Raw Returns Market Adjusted Returns  
Days (t+n) Coefficient  Buy Sell Hold Buy Sell Hold 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.72189 2.75389 0.68985 0.13933 1.24722 0.57444 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0642) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.03675 -0.09018 -0.05512 -0.03000 -0.02987 -0.02649 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00819 -0.02668 -0.00597 -0.00097 -0.01255 -0.00554 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1965) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.19453 3.66695 1.32030 0.63492 2.16255 1.28544 
  (0.0387) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.05691 -0.12194 -0.07627 -0.05128 -0.05929 -0.05104 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00334 -0.03556 -0.01200 -0.00568 -0.02170 -0.01253 
  (0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -0.22969 3.62326 1.45978 0.89214 3.05999 2.03065 
  (0.0525) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.06020 -0.1209 -0.07955 -0.07620 -0.11073 -0.08876 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 0.00435 -0.03495 -0.01299 -0.00778 -0.03043 -0.01965 
  (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.33965 2.27740 0.95989 1.56204 3.87921 2.39751 
  (0.0252) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04364 -0.04691 -0.03781 -0.10048 -0.13855 -0.10901 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐼 -0.00049 -0.02131 -0.00748 -0.01387 -0.03831 -0.02291 
  (0.7468) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.10: Regression on the Returns with Controls for the CBOE’s VIX 
This table represent the following models:  𝑅𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋 across columns 3-5, where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of raw returns. Columns 6-8 display represent 𝑃𝐸𝑅
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐼𝑋, where 𝑃𝐸𝑅
𝑉𝑊_𝑀𝑘𝑡 represents the dependant variable of market adjusted returns.  The independent variables of the model are VIX  indicating the level of the volatility in the market tracked through 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index across the recommendation period 𝑡. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 representing a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are following the GFC. 
Should the coefficient 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 be negative and significant the model suggests that the years following the GFC had lower returns than prior to the crisis. The table highlights the coefficients across buy, sell and hold 
recommendations. 
  Raw Returns Market Adjusted Returns  
Days (t+n) Coefficient          Buy         Sell         Hold         Buy         Sell         Hold 
1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00529 0.00499 0.00530 0.00179 0.00065 0.00192 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.3256) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00032 -0.00067 -0.00025 -0.00049 -0.00098 -0.00016 
  (0.0756) (0.1620) (0.1980) (0.0015) (0.0270) (0.3359) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00026 -0.00024 -0.00024 -0.00007 -0.00001 -0.00008 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8244) (<.0001) 
5 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.01955 0.01952 0.02178 0.00439 0.00682 0.00958 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00167 -0.00272 -0.00241 -0.00206 -0.00308 -0.00148 
  (<.0001) (0.0134) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0020) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00092 -0.00076 -0.00085 -0.00015 -0.00025 -0.00042 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (<.0001) 
30 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.07831 0.08858 0.08828 0.01841 0.03987 0.03594 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00641 -0.01084 -0.00709 -0.00965 -0.01073 -0.00661 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.0032 -0.00333 -0.00324 -0.00052 -0.00178 -0.00144 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
60 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.12862 0.12362 0.13212 0.03923 0.06573 0.05786 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.02301 -0.03619 -0.02665 -0.02145 -0.02200 -0.01708 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00401 -0.00387 -0.00400 -0.00075 -0.00337 -0.00223 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.9 Continued  
 
 
 
 
  
  Raw Returns Market Adjusted Returns  
Days (t+n) Coefficient           Buy        Sell         Hold         Buy         Sell         Hold 
90 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.17751 0.14169 0.16320 0.05323 0.07578 0.06516 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.03096 -0.04145 -0.03277 -0.02793 -0.01848 -0.02010 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00485 -0.00427 -0.00460 -0.00060 -0.00445 -0.00245 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
120 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.21162 0.14741 0.18252 0.06759 0.09162 0.07352 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04565 -0.06306 -0.04672 -0.04261 -0.03650 -0.03542 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00445 -0.00334 -0.00422 -0.00017 -0.00542 -0.00237 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1112) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
180 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.30732 0.24240 0.26877 0.10789 0.08463 0.08611 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.04677 -0.05375 -0.04306 -0.06627 -0.06882 -0.06164 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00617 -0.00803 -0.00698 0.00021 -0.00433 -0.00152 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1685) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
252 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.34560 0.27166 0.29943 0.13112 0.03465 0.07623 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) (<.0001) 
 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.03420 -0.00423 -0.01349 -0.08844 -0.08159 -0.08069 
  (<.0001) (0.0054) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 𝑉𝐼𝑋 -0.00330 -0.00839 -0.00556 0.00244 -0.00017 0.00139 
  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7584) (<.0001) 
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Table 5.11: Regression on the Returns with Controls for the Fama-French Five-factor Model 
This table represent the following model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 =  𝛾0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑀𝑊) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑀𝐴) + 𝛾1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶. Where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of raw daily returns and where 
𝑅𝑓 reflects the risk free rate, represented by the yield of a one-month treasury bill across columns 2-4. Where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of monthly daily returns and where 𝑅𝑓 reflects the risk free rate, 
represented by the yield of a one-month treasury bill across columns 5-7. Where 𝑅𝑖 represents the dependant variable of raw annualised returns and where 𝑅𝑓 reflects the risk free rate, represented by the yield of a one-
month treasury bill across columns 8-10. The independent variables of the model are the daily, monthly and yearly five factors of the Fama-French Model, 𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓, 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑅𝑀𝑊, 𝐶𝑀𝐴 downloaded from the 
Kenneth French website applied to the respective returns. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 if the announcement and subsequent returns are following the GFC. The table highlights the coefficients 
across buy, sell and hold recommendations. 
 Daily Returns Monthly Returns Yearly Returns 
Coefficient          Buy         Sell        Hold Buy Sell Hold Buy Sell Hold 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  0.00113 0.00164 0.00098 0.01154 0.00683 0.01381 0.16757 -0.02806 0.08524 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0024) (<.0001) 
𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓  -0.01356 0.02552 -0.03140 0.00141 0.00373 0.00258 0.00217 0.00038 0.00252 
 (0.3033) (0.4524) (0.0071) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5962) (<.0001) 
𝑆𝑀𝐵  0.38927 0.25077 0.39267 0.00694 0.00792 0.00720 0.01488 0.01764 0.01306 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
𝐻𝑀𝐿  -0.11049 -0.18883 -0.10008 0.00814 0.01012 0.00947 0.00026 0.00564 0.00128 
 (0.0051) (<.0001) (0.0042) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4729) (<.0001) (0.0003) 
𝑅𝑀𝑊  -0.74792 -0.82128 -0.66990 -0.00708 -0.00480 -0.00650 0.01370 0.01790 0.01402 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
𝐶𝑀𝐴  -0.10073 -0.46479 0.06254 -0.00294 -0.00195 -0.00503 -0.00166 0.00256 -0.00014 
 (0.0381) (0.0002) (0.1343) (<.0001) (0.0197) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.5997) 
𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇_𝐺𝐹𝐶  -0.00046 -0.00153 -0.00089 -0.00900 -0.00485 -0.00521 -0.03646 -0.01633 -0.04545 
 (0.0126) (0.0011) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0373) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusions 
  
Financial analysts reporting plays an important role in the information transfer between firms 
and the wider market. Nowhere is this information more clearly presented that in the 
recommendations that analysts provide for the firms that they cover. The issuance of simple 
buy, hold and sell recommendations provide investors with optimistic, neutral and pessimistic 
opinions regarding the future prospects of the covered firm.  
This thesis explores the returns that can be made should investors choose to follow 
these recommendations. The results indicate that analysts’ forecasts can be influential for 
investors; by following them investors will be able to achieve (avoid) positive (negative) 
returns. The investment strategy requires investors to find the consensus regarding a firm on 
the day of the recommendation itself and invest based on what the majority of analysts believe. 
The strategy is therefore simple for investors to implement but the return data indicates that it 
can be very rewarding. Raw returns 252 days were positive at 22.08%, showing that despite 
simplicity there is clear economic significance to the findings. Even after these returns are 
adjusted by the market, size and industry of the recommended firm 252 day returns of 12.39%, 
4.170% and 3.11% respectively are still achievable. Thus confirming that the specific firms 
that the analysts are recommending are generating excess returns after adjusting by control 
factors.  
The returns that can be made on sell recommendations were not as clear cut as those 
observed on buy recommendations, however investors can still avoid losses when adjusted by 
market, size and industry. The raw returns on sell recommendations were positive at 4.21%, 
indicating that should the investor had sold as advised they would have lost out on returns over 
the 252 days following the recommendations. However the bull markets of the early-to-mid-
2000s saw prices rise across the market rather aggressively. Therefore, when these returns are 
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adjusted the returns are negative at -2.04%, -9.02%, -6.16%, for market, size and industry 
adjusted return respectively. These returns suggest that analysts are accurate at selecting firms 
that will underperform relative to others, but that the firm itself may not actually generate 
negative returns. Analysts are therefore successful at identifying losers relative to the market 
and the same size decile and industry. 
The raw and market adjusted returns regarding hold recommendations were positive at 
13.24% and 4.66% by day 252, suggesting that firms that are able to gain the coverage of 
analysts will achieve positive returns; but to a lesser level than when buy recommendations are 
issued. However, when these returns were adjusted by the relevant size decile and industry of 
the firm the returns became negative with returns at day 252 of -2.25% and -1.76% respectively. 
Analysts have a tendency to cover larger firms (Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) 
but also firms in market areas with high potential for growth (Jegadeesh et al., 2004); when 
these adjustments are accounted for the returns become negative. Additionally, an analyst’s 
hesitance to issue buy recommendations, issuing hold instead, appears to lead investors to buy 
stocks with the more positive outlook; investors prefer the positive outlook of a buy over the 
positive outlook of a hold recommendations.24 Hence firms with buy recommendations in the 
same industry as those receiving hold recommendations may see investors gravitate toward 
them, leaving the firms with a hold recommendations to not experience the same return growth, 
despite both having positive futures to the analysts.   
After providing evidence that returns can be generate by following the 
recommendations of analysts’ the thesis then explores what impact the GFC may have had on 
market reactions to these recommendations. The hypothesis is that due to investor’s loss of 
confidence in the analysts for not warning them about the impending crises and the behaviour 
                                                          
24 Which is to be expected, but of note.  
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of banks in the lead up and during the crisis there would now be a breakdown in the degree of 
trust between the analysts and banks, and the market. This decrease in trust would result in a 
market that is now less reactive to positive recommendations of analysts as investors now have 
lower confidence in the quality of these reports as they did not provide warning of the 
impending crisis in 2007. However, despite this decline for positive recommendations the 
literature suggests that because investors have a loss aversion they would now place more 
emphasis on sell recommendations; thus resulting in more negative returns following the GFC 
on these recommendations.  
Testing of a change in the returns that were generated following an analysts 
recommendation in the years after the GFC indicate that there was a decrease (increase) in the 
markets reactivity for positive (negative) recommendations. 
The regression results indicate that in the years following the GFC raw returns on 
analysts buy recommendations are statistically lower than before it across all time periods. This 
stands true for the market adjusted returns also. However, when the size and industry of the 
firm are considered the results vary. Size adjusted returns following buy recommendations only 
reveal a significant difference between pre-GFC and post-GFC returns 252 days following a 
recommendation, suggesting that much of the short-term momentum between the periods 
remains. Yet once this momentum has subsided the return deviation is apparent.  When the 
returns are adjusted by the industry of the recommended firm much of the difference between 
pre-GFC and post-GFC returns again diminishes. These results suggest that the size and 
industry of the firm are key contributing factors behind the declines in raw returns following 
the GFC; however additional research on this effect will be required to further explain the 
relationship. 
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The results on sell recommendations are in-line with the hypothesized predictions; that 
loss aversion has now driven investors to be more reactive to analyst sell recommendations 
after the GFC than they were before it. Raw and market adjusted returns following sell 
recommendations are more negative post-GFC. The explanation for this comes from loss 
aversion, wherein investors have an asymmetric interpretation of information. Investors prefer 
to avoid losses more than they are willing to take equal risks to make returns. This leads to a 
situation where despite a potential decrease in trust following positive recommendations, 
investors are now more inclined to follow sell recommendation of analysts as they fear have 
heightened for of the associated losses. These lower returns are evident in all time periods 
tested for raw returns and market adjusted returns. However, as with buy recommendations, 
when the returns are adjusted by the size and industry of the firm much of the decreased 
reactivity that was previously evident becomes insignificant. This suggests that the size and 
industry of the firm explains the decline in returns after the GFC following sell 
recommendations.  
Finally, the markets’ reaction to hold recommendations also appear lower after the 
GFC. This again falls in-line with hypotheses 5 and 6 of the thesis. Once more the results on 
hold recommendations indicate raw and market adjusted returns that are lower post-GFC and 
the results following size and industry adjustments to the returns showing mostly statistically 
insignificant differences.  
These results were then adjusted by the volatility and confidence of the market and the 
Fama-French five-factor model to test for robustness. The adjustments by market confidence 
and volatility indicate that whilst these factors did have a significant relationship with returns, 
it did not fully explain the decrease in returns following the GFC. The returns when adjusted 
for the Fama-French five-factor show that size (proxied through SMB) was the most impactful 
factor of the model; however it, along with the other factors, could not explain the decrease in 
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market reactivity. Hence given these tests the argument of a change in trust being a driving 
factor behind the return difference before and after the crisis increases in robustness.  
Evidence from existing literature also suggests that there were increases in the level of 
firm transparency, decreases in analyst forecasting error and dispersion, and unchanged level 
of analyst coverage in the years that follow the GFC. The literature suggests that when these 
factors move in the direction that they have the market should see an increases in its reactivity 
to the information releases from analysts, but the evidence of this thesis suggests otherwise. 
The return data shows that despite these changes to analysts after the GFC the returns did not 
reflect a more reactive market to positive recommendations.25 Hence it is hypothesized that 
there is an alternate factor driving the change in reactivity, this being a change in trust.  
Yet, despite the decline in reactivity trading strategies that replicate the 
recommendations of analysts still provide abnormal returns, even when adjusting the returns 
by market, firm industry and firm size. Therefore it appears that whilst there is a decline, the 
analysts are still adding value to the market through their recommendations.  
                                                          
25 With sell recommendations being driven out of investors heightened loss aversion behaviour.  
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